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ABSTRACT 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Special Operations Headquarters 
(NSHQ) is the primary point of development, direction, and coordination for all NATO 
Special Operations–related activities.  NSHQ could enhance the effectiveness of NATO 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) and increase the probability of mission accomplishment 
when NATO SOF assets are collectively employed in a combined manner by adding an 
operational command and control capability.  This would be in the form of a Special 
Operations Component Command (SOCC) “Core.”  The SOCC Core is an advanced 
party of 70–150 personnel who provide an organic, rapidly deployable headquarters (HQ) 
capability for NSHQ.  NSHQ does not currently have the ability to provide NATO with a 
rapidly deployable asset package, which would include a full suite of operational 
command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence (C4I) capabilities 
equipped with organic SOF and their enablers. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine equipment and deployment 
configurations that will fulfill the mission requirements of the SOCC Core.  An analysis 
of alternatives is conducted to determine which equipment types and configurations 
achieved the desired robust mission capability at the lowest possible cost.  The focus is 
on the make-up of the four sub-components of the SOCC Core.  These sub-components 
are the Operations Center (OPCEN), All-Source Center (ASC), Support Center 
(SUPCEN), and the Signals Center (SIGCEN).  Possessing a rapidly deployable SOCC 
Core would be a sound step toward establishing and ensuring interoperability among 
allied SOF units and commands and would enhance the employment of NATO SOFs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
This project was conducted at the request of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) to develop materiel 
options that would contribute to the creation of a rapidly deployable headquarter (HQ). 
The focus of this study is on the four “CENs” [Logistics Center (LOGCEN), Support 
Center (SUPCEN), Operations Center (OPCEN), All-Source Center (ASC), and Signal 
Center (SIGCEN)]. 
NSHQ desired to have the rapidly deployable HQ solution come within $12M.  
This study investigates options for all four “CENs” and makes recommendations to the 
leadership of NSHQ based upon requirement, capability, value, and durability.  Leading 
up to our recommendations, we will discuss the origin of NSHQ and how it has evolved 
into an operational command.  This will help the reader understand the rationale and 
imperative for the desired rapidly deployable HQ.  Additionally, we will provide the 
background of NSHQ’s formation, structure, and doctrine to gain a better understanding 
of how NSHQ operates.    
We also will review what has been written about developing a rapidly deployable 
HQ before laying out the problem that NSHQ is seeking to solve.  The core of this project 
revolves around the four “CENs”; moreover, the requirements, the capabilities available, 
and the best equipment for each “CEN” to fulfill the mission.  At the conclusion of this 
project, we have made recommendations based on extensive research to effectively 
develop a rapidly deployable HQ. 
A. ORIGIN OF THE NSHQ 
The NSHQ is a concept that emerged from the NATO Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) Transformation Initiative (NSTI) approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) 
on November 22, 2006.  There are currently 28 NATO member nations, and 26 of those 
possess SOF.  The NSHQ initiative was intended to effectively orchestrate collective 
SOF employment by NATO member nations.  Figure 1 displays the national flags and 
























Note. The dotted lines are nations newly joining NSHQ or expressing their intent to 
increase or reallocate personnel from ongoing NATO reorganization. 
Figure 1.   NSHQ Contributing Nations (NSHQ Unpublished Brief, 2011) 
Historically, NATO SOF groups have been employed individually by each 
member nation. Operations in the Balkans, security during the 2004 Olympic Games in 
Athens, and the initial offensive in Afghanistan are all examples of NATO SOF 
employment.  Although allied SOF have maintained contact with one another and have 
conducted training exercises together over the years, these interactions have been 
intermittent and on an ad hoc basis. 
B. RATIONALE AND IMPERATIVE FOR THE DEPLOYABLE HQ 
Launched in 2006, NSTI was the first move toward rectifying historical 
deficiencies associated with the employment of NATO SOF in multinational efforts.  The 
NSHQ’s Biennial Review (NATO, 2011, p.6) has a timeline that describes the steps and 
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stages that culminated with the formation of NSHQ.  NATO held the Riga Summit on 
November 28–29, 2006.  Attendees of this summit focused on the transformation of 
NATO.  An article on the Riga Summit’s webpage (http://www.rigasummit.lv/en/) 
quoted President Bush as stating that NATO was in transition from a static force to an 
expeditionary force and that NATO’s Special Operation Forces initiative was one of the 
key things on the table at the summit.  At the Riga Summit, heads of state and 
governments endorsed NSTI (NSHQ, 2010d, p. 6). 
Today, SOF fill a far more significant role than they did in the environment for 
which the original NATO military structure was designed.  NATO’s current SOF staff 
structure, despite having made important contributions, is inadequately located, 
resourced, and connected in order to accomplish the necessary strategic groundwork that 
today’s environment demands.  The challenge today is to coordinate strategic SOF 
solutions based on standardized and validated capabilities. 
A solution to the challenge mentioned above was addressed by NATO, with three 
recommendations: 
1. Reposition the Directorate of Special Operations Office (DSOO) on the 
special staff of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).  The 
intention of NATO was to position SOF to deliver special operations-
related advice and assistance directly into the strategic level at the Allied 
Command Operations (ACO). 
2. Create the NATO SOF Coordination Centre (NSCC).  The North Atlantic 
Council (NAC) on September 25, 2009, later directed the NSCC to 
reorganize into NSHQ.  
3. Develop a NATO SOF Training and Education Program (NSTEP).  This 
effort is focused on NATO SOF-specific training and education intended 
to enhance commonality in doctrine, procedures, and (in some cases) 
equipment among allied SOF.  (NSHQ, 2010) 
 4
C. THE MISSION AND VISION OF NATO SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
HEADQUARTERS 
The mission of NSHQ is to serve as “the primary point of development, direction 
and coordination for all NATO Special Operations related activities to optimize the 
employment of SOF, to include providing an operational command capability when 
directed by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)” (NSHQ, 2009a).  The 
objective is for NSHQ to enhance the probability of collaborative success when allied 
SOF assets operate in a combined manner.  Adding an “operational command capability” 
in the mission includes an operational command and control role through provision of the 
“core” for an organic, rapidly deployable SOCC when directed by the SACEUR.   
According to its NATO International Military Body status, NSHQ can be tasked 
to support different elements of NATO and other national entities by deploying tailored 
planning and liaison teams.  The vision of NSHQ is to be the alliance SOF proponent for 
NATO SOF policy, standards, doctrine, training, education, and assessments. In this 
position, NSHQ maintains and develops a robust operational command, control, 
communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) capability, equipped with organic 
SOF enablers to ensure interoperability and to enhance employment of NATO Special 
Operations (NSHQ, 2010). 
D. LEADERSHIP AND STRUCTURE OF NSHQ 
As a member of SACEUR special staff, the NSHQ director provides advice on 
Special Operations. In this essential function, NSHQ enables and supports NATO SOF 
throughout the alliance and provides the focal point for NATO Special Operations 
expertise to SACEUR and ACO.  (NSHQ, 2010c) 
NSHQ is a NATO organization that receives personnel from NATO member 
nations through a memorandum of understanding (MOU).  Member nations apply for and 
offer personnel based on the size and maturity of their SOF.  An NSHQ SOC CORE 
Concept Brief (NSHQ unpublished brief, 2010g) detailed the current manning, which 
indicated it is at its initial operating capability (IOC) of 149 positions.  NATO’s goal is to 
have growth in three phases.  Phase one is the IOC.  Phase two includes a deployable 
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headquarters element of approximately 70 personnel, a slated personnel level of 188, and 
a 2012 implementation date.  Phase three includes multiple deployable headquarters 
elements, a desired personnel level of 214, and a 2013 implementation date. 
Figure 2 is a diagram of the current NSHQ command structure.  This flat 
organization not only emphasizes, but also requires, decentralized decision-making of 
subordinate departments under a centralized command and control element.  This 
structure will be duplicated with the deployable headquarters element NSHQ and will 
supply to future contingency operations. 
 
 
Figure 2.   NSHQ Organizational Chart (NSHQ Unpublished Brief, 2011) 
1. NATO and NSHQ Supporting Documents 
In the document Final Decision on MC 324/2, The NATO Military Command 
Structure (NATO, 2010b), NATO lists critical success factors for the alliance.  One of 
the most important to our study is how NATO military operations rely on communication 
and information system infrastructure for effective command and control (C2; NATO, 
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2010b).  NATO alliance nations must be committed to resource the headquarters (HQs), 
and host nations with available capacity must assist NATO while it is operating in their 
territory. 
NSHQ is a new and evolving organization, which was instructed to develop a 
rapidly deployable HQ. NSHQ receives its authority from the document Draft MC Policy 
for Allied Forces and Their Use for Operations (NATO, 2011).  In this document, NATO 
Military Authorities (NMA) agreed to the NATO Deployable Forces (NDF) concepts. 
In the Background section of the Draft MC Policy (NATO, 2011), NATO states,  
This policy is a single overarching concept, eliminating redundancy, and 
integrates new deployable operational C2 structures (notably NSHQ) 
agreed through the Peacetime Establishment (PE) Review of the NATO 
Military Command Structure [NCS].  NCS provides NATO with the 
capability to conduct both Article 5 and Non-Article 5 Crisis Response 
Operations (NA5CRO). (p. 3) 
Later in the document, NATO addresses the key elements necessary for a force to 
be considered deployable.  It states,  “For a HQ or a unit to be ‘declared ready’, it is to be 
manned, trained and equipped to the necessary predefined and agreed standards, laid 
down by SACEUR, which will be identified in the ACO Force Standards (AFS)” 
(NATO, 2011). 
In this document, NATO also addresses SOF, specifically with a paragraph in the 
NATO Force Structure (NFS) section that breaks down SOF elements:   
SOF offer specific capabilities which are heavily reliant upon a wide range 
of enablers.  Nations are expected to provide SOF with their full suite of 
organic enablers and Combat Support and Combat Service Support units.  
A Special Operations Component Command (SOCC) must in principle be 
generated for every operation involving the employment of SOF.  A 
SOCC is formed around NSHQ or a SOF framework nation and is 
structured for each operation according to the number of Special 
Operations Task Groups (SOTGs) assigned and the degree of C2 required. 
(NATO, 2011) 
The SOF policy with which NSHQ must operate is dictated in the 3rd Draft MC 
0437/2 Special Operations Policy (NATO, 2010a).  This document includes a list of the 
items differentiating SOF from conventional forces: 
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Politico-military considerations may require discreet or covert techniques 
and the acceptance of a degree of political, military, or physical risk not 
associated with conventional operations.  SOF are strategic assets to be 
employed to help achieve strategic and specified operational-level 
objectives.  They differ from other joint forces principally through their 
unique capabilities, agility, and flexibility.  SOF are commanded through a 
SOCC usually under an operational-level HQ alongside land, air, or 
maritime forces.  In a burgeoning crisis SOF may establish an early 
forward presence in order to initiate military and civilian liaisons, conduct 
area assessments, provide an early command and control capability, or 
advise friendly forces.  SOF provide NATO with increased understanding 
of a developing crisis and, if required, help set the conditions for the initial 
entry of joint forces. (p. 3) 
The draft policy also lists the three principal tasks of NATO SOF (Table 1):  
military assistance (MA), special reconnaissance (SR), and direct action (DA). 
 
Table 1.   NATO SOF Principal Tasks 
MA is a broad range of activities that support and influence critical 
friendly assets through training, advising, mentoring, or the conduct of 
combined operations.  The range of MA is thus considerable, and includes, 
but is not limited to, capability building of friendly security forces; 
engagement with local, regional, and national leadership or organizations; 
and civic actions supporting and influencing the local population. (NATO, 
2010a) 
Military assistance is important in building lasting relationships that benefit all 
involved nations in ways that cannot be quantified, as these relationships will enable 
NSHQ to operate more effectively through an enhanced collaborative network (NATO, 
2010a). 
The next NATO SOF and in turn NSHQ principal task is SR. 
SR is an activity conducted by SOF to support the collection of a 
commander’s Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) by employing 
unique capabilities.  These activities may vary widely, from traditional 







may include, but are not limited to: human intelligence (HUMINT) 
collection, close target reconnaissance, or the employment of Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets.”  (NATO, 2010a) 
Surveillance and reconnaissance are two key methods to be used by the SOCC 
Core commander to gain essential intelligence generated from his own personnel on the 
ground.  It is risky, because a compromise in the field could put future missions at risk 
and provide a warning to those being watched (NATO, 2010a). 
DA is the third of the three principal tasks to be conducted by NSHQ.  A 
definition of DA taken from the NATO SOF Policy document: 
DA is a precise offensive operation conducted by SOF which is limited in 
scope and duration in order to seize, destroy, disrupt, capture, exploit, 
recover, or damage high value or high payoff targets.  DA differs from 
conventional offensive actions in the level of risk, techniques employed, 
and the degree of precision utilized to achieve a specific effect. (NATO, 
2010a)  
Direct action missions are violent, aggressive, and surgical strikes conducted at 
great risk to the operators.  Successful operations have the ability to yield an abundance 
of intelligence and generate strategic effects. 
The SOCC has operational control (OPCON) of each individual nation’s SOF 
Special Operations Task Group (SOTG).  Individual alliance nations never relinquish full 
command of their forces.  Because there is no standing SOCC, an SOCC must be 
generated for each operation in which the SACEUR and the NATO Security Council 
approves NATO involvement.  NATO (2010a) defines an SOCC as “a multi-national or 
national command formed around a SOF Framework Nation and … structured for each 
operation according to the number of SOTGs assigned and the degree of C2 required”  
(p. 4).  With the SOCC defined, the unit will not be considered deployable until it 
achieves full operational capacity.  According to NATO (2010a), “At full operational 
capacity, NSHQ can provide a rapidly deployable initial core of an operational SOCC.  
This capability does not replace the requirement of a SOF Framework Nation but does 
serve as a requisite enhancement to SOF force generation” (p. 5). 
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There are two key responsibilities of NSHQ. The first responsibility is to “provide 
NATO SOF expertise and enablers while retaining an organic command, control, 
communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) capability in the support and 
employment of SOF in NATO operations” (NATO, 2010a.)  The other key responsibility 
of NSHQ is to provide an initial core of an operational SOCC upon the direction of the 
SACEUR (NATO, 2010a).  The key responsibility of NATO SOF contributing nations is 
to supply the full suite of enablers, combat support (CS), and combat service support 
(CSS) elements their SOF troops rely on.  When an SOF troop is provided to NATO, and 
subsequently to an SOCC in a joint operations area (JOA), it must be fully enabled 
organically (NATO, 2010a). 
E. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH NSHQ WILL OPERATE 
The strategic environment in which NSHQ operates is a constantly changing and 
evolving environment.  There are known flashpoints and areas of unrest throughout the 
world.  NATO and NSHQ are in a constant cycle of gathering intelligence and making 
operational preparations in an effort to impact these areas for the greater good of mankind 
(and, in turn, NATO alliance nations).  NSHQ’s flexibility, agility, capability, training, 
and skills give it an advantage in responding to situations for which there could be no 
prior preparation.  Through an exhaustive, thorough, and detailed intelligence analysis, 
NATO attempts to be preemptive in its analysis of all the things that could possibly 
happen.  A part of its analysis is identifying indicators.  Once these indicators are 
identified, it is up to NATO and its vast intelligence network to monitor them (NATO, 
2010a).   
Key worldwide indicators are addressed and analyzed in the classified NATO 
secret document NATO Strategic Intelligence Estimate: Final Decision on MC 
0161/NSIE/10 (NSHQ, 2010d).  The document breaks down identifying indicators into 
three sections: transnational trends and emerging technologies (terrorism, cyber-threats, 
etc.), geopolitical environment (regional trouble spots that may include Sub-Saharan 
Africa, etc.), and transnational assessments.  Transnational assessments may include the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and environmental and resource 
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issues of special interest.  Geopolitical assessments are then conducted on each 
worldwide region with indicators of potential crisis (NSHQ, 2010a). 
The purpose of Chapter I was to illustrate how quick NSHQ has evolved.  
NSHQ’s roots began with few motivated individuals acting as a liaison between the 
different nations’ SOF commands.  NSHQ has come a long way in a short amount of 
time.  Adding operation command capability and developing a C4I infrastructure is the 
next milestone for NSHQ.   This achievement will further increase their success while 
operating in a complex environment.  Chapter II will discuss, in greater detail, the 
background of NSHQ’s evolution. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
In Chapter I, we provided an introduction to NATO Special Operations; in this 
chapter, we provide some background into the formation of NSHQ.  In 1980, a failed 
mission to rescue U.S. hostages held by terrorists in Iran (Operation Eagle Claw) 
displayed how ineffective U.S. Special Forces were when they used ad hoc command and 
control with units brought together quickly to execute high-profile, high-risk missions.  
These units did not have a habitual relationship in a training or real-world environment.  
In 1987, the U.S. military rectified this shortfall by forming the United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM).   
NATO did not require an operational failure on the world stage to goad them into 
addressing the need to change the manner in which their SOF were employed.  From 
1991 to 2006, Norway, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, 
and Italy followed suit by forming national SOF organizations (NSCC, 2008).  On 
November 29, 2006, at the NATO Riga Summit, the heads of state and government 
officials of NATO member nations approved the NATO SOF Transformation Initiative 
(NSTI). 
A. THE FORMATION OF NATO SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
HEADQUARTERS 
In September 2006, the North Atlantic Military Committee (NSHQ, 2006) 
published NSTI Advice, a document in which the committee recommended three elements 
as the foundation for NATO SOF’s transformation.   The first element was enhancing 
staff capacity at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) by creating the 
SHAPE Special Operations Office (SSOO); the second element was establishing a 
NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC); and the third element was developing a 
NATO Federation of SOF Training Centers. 
With these three elements, NATO SOF went from a fusion center to a 
coordination center.  The role of the SSOO was to provide the SACEUR with resident 
strategic-level Special Operations advice in order to direct and enable the employment of 
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alliance SOF (NSHQ, 2006).  The SACEUR made requests for NATO SOF through the 
SSOO, which passed these requests to the NSCC.  The role of the NSCC was to provide 
the SACEUR with Special Operations expertise for strategic and operational planning to 
include the conduct of operations.  The director of the NSCC was responsible for 
providing flag officer advice to the SACEUR.  The NSCC coordinated the efforts of 
NATO SOF in the conduct of operations and missions (NSHQ, 2006).  A diagram of the 
NSCC’s structure is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3.   NSCC Structure (NSHQ, 2006) 
The U. S. became the framework nation for the NSCC.  With framework nation 
status, the U.S. agreed to provide funds to establish the center and to supply 30% of the 
personnel.  Each NATO nation with a mature SOF provided as few as two qualified SOF 
personnel on three-year tours to support the coordination center.  The NSHQ’s 2011 
Biennial Review timeline states that the NSCC started as a 23-man implementation team 
in Stuttgart, Germany (NSHQ, 2011).  By February 2007, the NSCC director led a NATO 
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senior SOF leader assessment to Afghanistan, after which the NSCC began supporting 
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.  In July 2007, the 
NSCC was relocated to SHAPE in Mons, Belgium.  Between August 2008 and May 
2009, the NSCC went from initial operational capability (IOC; approximately 56 
personnel) to full operational capacity (FOC; approximately 150 personnel), as directed 
in the NSTI guidance (NSHQ, 2011). 
In reaching IOC, the NSCC established a facility with a NATO communications 
information system capable of supporting the staff with synchronization and planning for 
SOF operations.  From its inception, the NSCC has been in the process of rebuilding and 
redesigning NATO SOF doctrine.  It also provided support to NATO military exercises.  
This is only a sample of an abundant list of accomplishments achieved by the NSCC to 
reach FOC.  Reaching FOC was quite an accomplishment for a command that started 
with one person: Rear Admiral William H. McRaven.  It was under Rear Admiral 
McRaven that the NSCC blossomed from a 23-man implementation team into an 
organization with FOC and over 100 personnel (NSHQ, 2011). 
In September 2009, the NAC authorized the reorganization of the NSCC into 
NSHQ.  By March of 2010, the NSCC had transitioned into NSHQ (NSHQ, 2011).  With 
the reorganization of the NSCC into NSHQ, NATO SOF took another step to reaching 
prominence in the worldwide arena of Special Operations.  NATO SOF was set up to 
operate as the command and control element of NATO Special Operations missions.  It is 
this role and its eventual accomplishment that is the focus of NSHQ. 
B. THE MAKE-UP OF NATO SPECIAL OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS 
Seven NATO nations currently possess mature and highly trained SOF personnel 
who are properly equipped with individual member nation HQ command and control 
capabilities. These member nations lead the forward-deployed SOCC in a command and 
control role.  These nations are the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy, 
Turkey, and Germany.  A possible eighth nation, Poland, is working to achieve this level 
of expertise in both tactics and strategy. 
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NSHQ is a memorandum of understanding (MOU) organization with NATO.  It is 
also a separate organization within NATO. As part of this understanding, each nation is 
primarily responsible to fulfill its duties within NATO.  Additionally, all the nations have 
agreed to support NSHQ without causing degradation in their NATO responsibilities.  An 
example of fulfilling this agreement can be seen in the personnel that are supplied to 
NSHQ from individual NATO member nations.  These personnel are in addition to any 
supplied to NATO.  Within the MOU, NSHQ member nations have agreed to supply 
assets to lift and transport personnel and equipment in response to a crisis or operation in 
which NSHQ participates.  This agreement exists because NATO itself does not possess 
strategic lift assets.  NSHQ is also responsible for its own sustainment and the generation 
of forces (through NSHQ member nations). 
NSHQ is currently manned at approximately 150 personnel with a goal of 
reaching 200 or more personnel to achieve FOC.  These 200 personnel will man and 
supply a forward-deployed HQ element in support of NSHQ/NATO SOF operations.  
The U.S. is the framework nation of NSHQ; with this, status comes a great responsibility.  
The U.S. is responsible for supplying 40% of the personnel for NSHQ where it use to 
supply 30% when it was the NSCC.  The U.S. has also agreed to provide all funding for 
the initial purchase of equipment to support forward-deployed operations with NSHQ as 
a Special Operations Component Command (SOCC) core element.  The costs of this 
initial purchase are expected to exceed $10 million. 
NATO member nations will supply NSHQ with the following elements to support 
its command and control capacity.  Special Operations Task Groups (SOTGs) will be 
supplied by NATO member nations that are SOF capable.  SOTGs will initially only be 
given from the seven NATO member nations with mature SOFs, listed previously in this 
section.  NSHQ’s training element will increase the capabilities of the other SOF-
possessing NATO member nations to a level that will enable them to support NATO SOF 
operations with their own SOTGs.  The make-up of SOTGs will differ depending on the 
organization of each SOF-possessing NATO member nation.  Each SOTG will be 
manned by 75–80 personnel and will have its own HQ element in direct communication 
with the SOCC Core element.  Within each SOTG, there will be up to six Special 
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Operations Task Units (SOTUs).  Each SOTU will have between eight and 16 SOF- 
qualified operators or SOF-designated support personnel (e.g., K-9 handlers, translators, 
etc.).  In a briefing we received from the NSHQ, Figure 4 diagrams some of the elements 
of an SOCC with its core functions/departments. 
 
 
Notes: HUMINT=Human Intelligence 
ISR=Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
SOIB=Special Operations Intelligence Branch 
IFC=Intelligence Fusion Center 
CJFSOCC=Combined Joint Force Special Operations Component Command  
SOTG=Special Operations Task Group 
Figure 4.   SOCC Diagram (Unpublished NSHQ Brief, 2011) 
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The purpose of Chapter II was to discuss in detail NSHQ’s background—how it 
was formed and how it was structured.  In Chapter III, we review what has been written 
about rapidly deployable headquarters. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Very little literature has been written about rapidly deployable headquarters for 
military units.   The literature that does exist fails to describe the layout of the 
headquarters once deployed or the inventory of equipment used to support critical 
functions, such as communications and life support.  The existing literature that is 
vaguely related to our study is focused on joint operations and the issues and concerns 
that are raised not only when operating jointly as a multinational military force, but also 
when different branches operate jointly. 
Colonel Scott Schisser from the Institute for Defense Analysis discussed the 
shortfalls of joint task force (JTF) headquarters in a 2001 paper entitled “Future Joint 
Force Headquarters.”   Even though his paper was written in 2001, he identified 
challenges that are still prevalent in joint operations today.  Schisser described how JTF 
headquarters were unprepared and insufficient to meet command and control challenges.  
Throughout his research, Schisser (2001) found that “regardless of the scale or scope ... a 
common theme has been command control of joint forces” (p. 1).  Lack of command and 
control significantly affects the success and efficiency of the deployable joint task force 
(DJTF).  Schisser also concluded that the joint response teams (JRTs) should be 
redesigned to effectively offer DJTFs with the tools and means to increase their self-
sufficiency in the field; furthermore, JRTs must stay informed to make quick and 
appropriate decisions.  The future of the DJTF should include cost-effective designs and 
products that enhance the operational level of deployable task forces.  Products need to 
be quick to set up and take down, efficient, convenient for operations and personnel; 
overall, they must be assets to the operations, missions, and desired outcomes. 
Colonel Mike McGinnis (2004) published a report about the development of a 
deployable headquarters for the NATO Response Force (NRF).  In his report, McGinnis 
identified many of the challenges that the JTF headquarters faced in Operation Stavanger.  
As NATO moves forward in the development of multinational joint rapidly deployable 
headquarters, leaders will need to preemptively emplace appropriate measures to avoid 
issues deriving from the challenges that McGinnis articulated:  
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 Varying Language Skills: NATO staffs have limited English language 
skills. 
 Disparity in Military Experience: In a multinational headquarters, rank 
alone is no guarantee that an individual assigned to a position possesses 
the requisite education and experience to do the job. 
 National Caveats: NATO operations require significant consensus 
building.  All NATO nations must be in general agreement on the scope of 
military operations before the NAC will issue an activation order to take 
military action.  Even after such an order is issued, nations may decline to 
conduct specific operations invoking national caveats.  Claiming national 
caveats or other restrictions, individuals assigned to a NATO multinational 
headquarters may elect to forego exercises and operations. 
 Intelligence Sharing, Computers, and Information Systems: Successful 
operations depend on shared intelligence, good communications, and 
interoperable computer and information systems across echelons’ 
headquarters.  Working in a multinational environment creates complex 
problems:  deciding what intelligence can be shared, communicating with 
different equipment, and operating on systems that are not compatible 
with one another.  NATO has not yet resourced a full suite of 
interoperable communications, information systems, and infrastructure for 
conducting such operations (McGinnis, 2004). 
McGinnis emphasizes implementation of proper intelligence sharing practices, 
computers, and information equipment in a multinational environment; moreover, this 
equipment not only needs to be compatible at the headquarters level and above, but also 
needs to be operable among all the units under the headquarters’ command.  Given the 
national caveats, clear communications on all levels help ensure that status and intent is 
exchanged; clear communications increase the success of proper decision-making.  
Within this equipment, further advanced language interpretation tools could be utilized to 
help mitigate the complications that arise from language barriers.  While training will 
allow the operators to gain knowledge and experience, uncomplicated equipment helps 
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address the issues related to disparity in experience.  Communications that allow the 
headquarters and units the capability of reaching back to their home commands for 
information further alleviate the problems that arise from inexperience.  
A solid communications infrastructure is essential for successful command and 
control. The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide, JFSC PUB 1 (Joint Forces Staff College, 2000), 
states: 
  Command and Control functions are performed through an arrangement 
of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures 
employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and 
controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. (p. 
3-52).   
McGinnis discusses the consequences to not having good command and control.  In many 
cases, organizations that did not have effective command and control proved to be 
costly—not just monetarily, but in terms of lives lost.  A good example of what can go 
wrong without proper command and control, from the top level to the lowest level, is 
Operation Eagle Claw (Radvanyi, 2002).  Operation Eagle Claw, a U.S. joint military 
operation, failed to rescue U.S. hostages being held captive at the U.S. Embassy in 
Tehran, Iran, on April 24, 1980.  In an investigation of Operation Eagle Claw, Admiral 
James L. Holloway and his investigative panel found that command and control was 
excellent at the upper echelons, but became more tenuous and fragile at the intermediate 
levels due to the interoperability of communication equipment used among the different 
services (Kyle, 1990).  Command relationships below the commander of the JTF were 
not clearly emphasized.  When compounded with the lack of compatible communications 
equipment, these relationships were misunderstood under pressure.  Lessons learned from 
Operation Eagle Claw revealed the significance of ensuring that all levels of a joint task 
force have the tools and training necessary to perform the mission; moreover, effective 
command and control at all levels is critical for any military operation.  As McGinnis 
points out, command and control is more challenging for a multination joint task force to 
establish.  Implementation of a solid communications infrastructure with compatible and 
interoperable equipment would help build the foundation for good command and control.  
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Both Schisser (2001) and McGinnis (2004) consistently discussed communication 
as being one of the most important aspects of command and control.  For NATO 
organizations, communication is more difficult.  English is the spoken language at 
NATO; however, English is a second language for most NATO operators.  The language 
barrier can create problems and make communication extremely difficult.  Technologies, 
such as virtual communications, are being utilized by NATO to help overcome the 
language barrier because they give individuals an opportunity to see facial and body 
expressions while hearing a fellow operator’s voice.    
In other joint operation cases, the use of different communication equipment was 
also a problem.  For example, in the 1983 U.S.-led invasion of Grenada, Operation Fury, 
the coalition of forces had problems communicating.  It was later documented that the 
problems were attributed to the different services operating with dissimilar types of 
communication equipment; the different types of communication equipment were not 
compatible from Service to Service.  Navy ships, within line of sight of Rangers and 
airborne troops, could not initially receive or respond to their requests for fire support.  
On two occasions, when Navy jets did respond, they attacked the wrong targets (Cole, 
1983).  Many of the member nations at NATO communicate with different equipment.  
Lessons learned from Operation Fury serve as evidence for the importance of 
standardizing communication equipment in joint operations to ensure compatibility—this 
is absolutely vital for multinational units to operate jointly. 
The articles reviewed in this chapter show how important it is to have a robust 
command and control center to operate successfully in today’s battlefield.  At the 
forefront of the command and control issue is the ability to communicate effectively both 
up and down the chain of command.  With the new technologies available to today’s war 
fighter from both military and commercial sources, the communication challenges 




The purpose of Chapter III was to analyze what has been written about rapidly 
deployable headquarters.  After our literature review, we can conclude that as NATO 
moves forward in conducting multinational joint operations, it is imperative that 
compatible and interoperable equipment, along with modern technologies, are being 
utilized to ensure the good command and control that is necessary for missions to 
succeed.  In Chapter IV, we will begin laying out the problem that will be solved by the 
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IV. THE PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED BY THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF A SOCC CORE 
Chapter IV focuses on establishing the problem that will be solved with the 
development of a Rapidly Deployable Special Operations Component Command (SOCC) 
Core Concept for the NSHQ.  We conducted research and analysis to examine and 
determine the equipment and deployment configurations that will fulfill the mission 
requirements of the SOCC Core.  In addition, we analyzed alternatives to determine 
which equipment types and configurations result in achieving the desired mission 
capability at the lowest possible cost.  
The NATO Special Operations Headquarters Framework Nation Primer states the 
mission of NSHQ: 
The mission of NSHQ is to serve as the primary point of development, 
direction and coordination for all NATO Special Operations related 
activities in order to optimize the employment of SOF.  Optimization is 
the intent to make SOF as effective, efficient, and perfect as possible to 
enhance the probability of collaborative success when these national assets 
come together to operate in a combined manner.  The addition of a 
directing function in the mission includes an operational command and 
control role through provision of the core for a deployable Special 
Operations Component Command when directed by SACEUR. (NSHQ, 
2009a) 
The addition of an operational command capability in the mission includes an 
operational command and control role through provision of the “core,” which is an 
advanced party of 70–150 personnel, for an organic, rapidly deployable Special 
Operations Component Command when directed by the SACEUR.  The NSHQ does not 
currently have the ability to provide NATO with a rapidly deployable asset package, 
which would include robust operational command, control, communication, computers, 
and intelligence (C4I) capabilities, equipped with organic special operations forces (SOF) 
enablers.  Possessing a rapidly deployable SOCC Core would be a sound step toward 
establishing and ensuring interoperability among allied SOF units and commands, and 
enhance the employment of NATO Special Operations forces. 
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The United States is the framework nation of NSHQ.  With this position, the 
United States has the responsibility to provide 100% of the initial funding and support for 
the SOCC Core concept.  This includes the initial issue of equipment required for a 
rapidly deployable headquarters element.  Once the initial issue of equipment is 
purchased and begins to be fielded, all 28 NATO member nations will share in the 
sustainment, operational, and maintenance costs of the SOCC Core. 
In the NSHQ Biennial Review, in a section titled “Deployable CJSOCC Core,” 
there is an explanation for this rapidly deployable concept: “Currently, unlike NATO’s 
Land, Maritime and Air capabilities within the military structure, the Alliance has no 
assured, deployable capability to provide C2 for NATO SOF.  By capitalizing on the 
personnel currently assigned to the NSHQ, an opportunity exists for the proposed NSHQ 
to realize a more cost-effective use of personnel, without growing NATO’s Peacetime 
Establishment (PE), while enhancing SACEUR’s crisis response options, through the 
provision of a CJFSOCC [Combined Joint Force Special Operations Component 
Command] (Core) element.  During peacetime or crisis, the NSHQ may be directed by 
SACEUR to assign the CJFSOCC (Core) to any NATO Command Structure (NCS) 
headquarters for CJTF operations and/or exercises.  This CJFSOCC (Core), when 
deployed for NATO approved operations, would continue to be under operational 
command (OPCOM) to SACEUR, and under operational control (OPCON) to the 
operational commander; the CJFSOCC would exercise OPCON of assigned forces.  This 
Core element relies on troop contributing nations to provide augmentees in accordance 
with standard NATO processes to transition the CJFSOCC from a short term to an 
enduring capability” (NSHQ, 2010c).  
There are currently seven nations which are trained and equipped to field a 
deployable HQ or SOCC.  This means that they possess the operational SOF experience 
and knowledge to control SOF operational elements for employment purposes.  They also 
possess limited issue communications equipment which could be used to control and 
oversee those operations.  Those seven nations are the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, and Turkey.  Turkey may not be considered 
capable or willing to provide SOCC Core capabilities past 2011.  Poland is attempting to 
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become the eighth nation that is SOCC capable.  Being SOCC capable does not mean that 
a country is a designated SOCC HQ.  This just means that the country is capable of 
running the SOCC Core once the equipment is purchased for it (NSHQ, 2010e). 
In a SACEUR-signed document called the Bi-Strategic Command, there was an 
agreement and requirement to have 19 SOCC-capable countries.  With only seven 
currently capable, this has created a gap of 12 countries desperately needed by NATO 
and NSHQ to be SOCC capable (NSHQ, 2010e).  More nations that are SOCC capable 
would mean more HQs that could be fielded by NSHQ on behalf of NATO.  There are 
currently 29 situations, or possible contingencies, that NATO would respond to.  Out of 
the 29, the NATO Response Force (NRF) would only respond to seven.  This leaves a 
gap of 22 possible worldwide contingency situations to which NSHQ could respond 
(NSHQ, 2010e). 
The NATO strategy MC 400/2 basically states that NATO will not specifically 
dictate how each country conducts SOF missions, but that each country should be capable 
of meeting seven key requirements.  The requirements are force readiness, infrastructure 
that is able to operate an effective C2 element, an effective intelligence system, 
effectiveness in engagement, the ability to sustain organic logistics, the ability to be 
deployable and mobile, and survivability for the environment in which they are operating.  
These are the key requirements, but they are basic standards from the perspective of 
operating a SOCC Core  (North Atlantic Military Committee, 2000).  
NSHQ is a multinational organization of 27 countries.  Having this many 
countries in an organization requires set standards for the equipment used in an operation, 
to ensure compatibility and interoperability.  While requiring each country to meet these 
standards is a major challenge, it is essential to the effective operation of a SOCC Core.     
The SOCC Core is an advance party of 70 to 150 personnel.  This is a rapidly 
deployable HQ that is organic to NSHQ and should be capable of overseeing command 
and control of six SOTGs and one SOATG.  It should be capable of deploying in less 
than 14 days.  It should also be capable of traveling by sea, air, or land.  All the 
equipment of the SOCC Core must be transportable by CH-47 helicopters. 
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The environment in which the SOCC Core will operate is ever-changing; thus, the 
camp of the SOCC Core must be flexible and versatile.  The camp must also be capable 
of supporting the three principal tasks of NSHQ and NATO SOF: direct action (DA), 
special reconnaissance (SR), and military assistance (MA).  NSHQ and the SOCC Core, 
when fully operational and capable, could be tasked with conducting these three core 
tasks anywhere in the world and in any environment or climate.   
The varieties of climatic conditions this camp may encounter make it necessary 
for the camp to meet NATO-directed guidelines, which are addressed in Chapter V.  In 
terms of the environment, the camp must be capable of sustaining the force when 
operating in the following threat conditions: hostile, uncertain, and benign.  These 
conditions encompass the wide spectrum of possible operations and environments—.from 
a full-blown, mature warzone to a third world, underdeveloped country with little threat 
to the force.  The SOCC Core camp must also be capable of having itself transported via 
C-130 from Belgium to the operating area, then transported via CH-47 for the last leg to 
the operational staging point for the SOCC Core. 
The four sections into which the camp will be broken down are the Operations 
Center (OPCEN), All Source Center (ASC; intelligence fusion node), Support Center 
(SUPCEN; provides Real Life Support [RLS]), and the Signals Center (SIGCEN, 
communications).  The four sub-components will provide the needed versatility and 
flexibility for NSHQ to pick and choose from its parts and pieces to develop capability-
based packages for each of the three SOF tasks/core missions. 
The three options for the camp that the thesis team is choosing among are 1) 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment, 2) items from a military logistics/supply 
system, or 3) a hybrid of these two options.  The thesis team will specify which 
equipment that should come from each source of supply.  Structural options for the camp 
which are available are hard container structures, which are currently being fielded by 
NSHQ; soft container structures, which are currently being fielded by SOCOM; and 
cheap soft structures that NSHQ could leave behind after a mission (foam structures).  
Another option is for a camp to use a combination of hard and soft structures.  NSHQ 
could also deploy to an area with existing structures and buildings; this may include a 
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shipboard option, which would place the SOCC Core on a ship with its containers.  All of 
the equipment has to be lightweight and air portable. 
The NATO Special Operations Forces Study (NSSC, 2008) describes the major 
requirements of a NATO CJFSOCC, which is essentially a SOCC Core: “The CJFSOCC 
headquarters has a combined and joint staff structure normally formed around a Special 
Operations Forces Fusion Node (SOF FN) nucleus providing, as a minimum, the 
commander, key staff personnel, base life support capabilities, and the command, control, 
communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) structure for operational control 
(OPCON) of all SOF in a designated theatre of operations.  The CJFSOCC normally 
controls between two and six JSOTFs, SOTGs and /or SOATGs.  Forces may also 
include conventional force under OPCON of the CJFSOCC” (pp. C4–C5). 
Then there is a list of criteria for the CJFSOCC.  It must be able to conduct 
NATO J1-J8 functions, advanced crisis response, time sensitive planning, and theatre-
level campaign planning.  It must be able to plan, coordinate, and direct special 
operations separately or as part of a larger force.  It must be able to develop operational 
intelligence and integrate ISR platforms, sensors, and HUMINT into theatre-level 
collection plans.  It must be able to operate, manage, and maintain NATO operational-
level communication and information systems (CIS) down to SOTG level.  It must 
manage the force protection for the SOCC Core camp.  It must coordinate and oversee 
CSS functions for the SOTGs.  It must have all classes of supply to sustain itself for at 
least 10 days.  Lastly, it must be able to direct special operations organically on its own 
or as part of a larger force or HQ structure” (paraphrased from NSCC, 2008, pp. C4–C5). 
The purpose of Chapter IV was to lay out the problem.  In Chapter V, we will 
provide the solution. 
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V. THE MATERIAL SOLUTION FOR THE RAPIDILY 
DEPLOYABLE SOCC 
The NSHQ is planning on procuring material for a rapidly deployable 
headquarters. The procurement plan is broken down into four sub-components that 
correspond to the sub-components that comprise the NSHQ SOCC Core.  These sub-
components are SUPCEN (Support Center), OPCEN (Operations Center), SIGCEN 
(Signal Center), and ASC (All Source Center). 
The following considerations will be included in the Procurement Plan (NSHQ, 
2011): 
1. Maintenance and Supply Support—establish near-term maintenance 
requirements to include spare part stocks and availability. Determine 
sustainment and life cycle replacement of parts and of systems.  
2. Packaging, Handling, Storage, and Transportation—identify designs and 
methods to ensure the systems are preserved, packed, stored, handled and 
transported properly. 
3. Support Equipment—identify all equipment required to support operations 
and maintenance of the system. 
4. Technical Data—identify scientific and technical information used to 
support the systems. 
5.  Training and Training Support—determine requirements to acquire 
training devices and conduct training of operators and maintenance 
personnel. 
6. Facilities—identify real property and storage containers required to 
support each of the systems. 
When building the life-support features of this rapidly deployable camp for this 
thesis, we considered many factors and characteristics,  including, but not limited to, 
weight, size, cubic dimensions, ease of setup, durability, transportability, functionality, 
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and cost. During this study, our team visited numerous operational units, along with 
several manufacturers, to gather our data. In this study, we compare four manufacturers: 
Alaska Structures, Base-X, DRASH, and Weatherhaven. These companies are by no 
means the only available manufacturers of military- style camps, but they are the vendors 
of camps that are  predominantly used for not only SOF operations, but also for other 
combat units throughout NATO and the U.S.  
When evaluating each camp manufacturer, we considered several factors. In 
Table 1, we present a general overview of these factors. Later in this thesis, we address 
the characteristics of the products of each vendor and explain the specific factors in more 
detail.  The grading and evaluations are taken from our visits to the various units and 
manufacturers of these camps.  The equipment manufacturers provided the weight, size, 
cube, and cost information. Information regarding the ease of setup, durability, 
transportability, and functionality came from both the manufacturer and from the current 
users of the particular camp. The manufacturers needed to meet or exceed specific factors 
in order to be considered for selection.  We used the following guidelines and 
specifications we received from the NSHQ’s J4 in our evaluation of each camp 
manufacture. 
 1. Environmental threats and conditions: 
  a. Snow load of 10 lb (5 kg) per sq ft (m) for 12 hours without  
   damage to the frame or structure  
 b. No observed leakage during wind-driven rain of 2 in. (5 cm) of 
rain  
   per hour at 35 mph (56 km/h) for 30 minutes 
  c. Ability to withstand wind load of 55 mph (89 km/h), with gusts up  
   to 65 mph (105 km/h) 
  d. Operational at -20–120 °F (-29–49 degrees °C) 
  e. Openings for 4 in. (10 cm) diameter flue stack and/or 16 in. (41  
   cm) diameter ECU ducts 
  f. Sufficient natural ventilation to support recommended number of  
   occupants and minimize condensation 
  g. Ability to be configured to provide entry and egress under blackout  
   conditions  
  h. Ability to be erected on rough, uneven, or sloped terrain 
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 2. Detection threats: 
  a. Matt or dull finish to fabric and support systems 
  b. Fabric in colors of green, tan, or white 
 
  c. Not observable at night with light inside 100m with naked eye or  
   300m with night-vision goggles  
  d. Fabric pigment matches infrared reflectance of intended climate  
   (i.e., temperate, desert, or arctic) 
  e. Compatible with standard camouflage net systems 
 
 3. Safety: 
  a. Flame resistance/char length/melt drip to meet ASTM d-6413-99,  
   paragraph 3.4.7, self-extinguishing within 2 seconds after exposure  
   to the flame source for 12 seconds in both the warp and fill  
   directions.  The damaged char length shall be less than 50% of the  
   sample length of 12 in. (30.5 cm). No melt drip. 
  b. No toxic materials used in paints or preservative coatings for frame  
   or fabric finish or coatings. 
  c. Meets human factors requirements for soldier lift (i.e., 37 lb/16.8  
   kg/  soldier) 
 
 4. Durability: 
  a. Can withstand 50 cycles of erect and strike for one year 
  b. Sustainable with repair parts, manuals, and logistical support 
  c. Capable of two years of continuous use 
 
 5. Other considerations:   
  a. Insect screens, door openings, vestibules, and compatibility with  
   soft and hard flooring  
  b. Erected in all environmental conditions 
  c. Transportable on 463 L pallet and by C-130, cargo HMMWV, 
   FMTV, and  LMTV 





A. SUPCEN (SUPPORT CENTER), COMPARISONS AND 
CHARACTERISTICS  SHELTERS: ALASKA STRUCTURES 
We visited several U.S. Army SOF units in Fort Bragg, NC, and a U.S. Naval 
Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM, NAVSOC, or NSWC) in San Diego, 
CA, where we met not only the users, but also the manufacturer of Alaska Structures 
shelters. We compared and considered several Alaska Structures models that could be 
used when building the camp. The first option we looked at was the Alaska Gable 
Shelter, a gable-roof, soft-sided structure (Figure 5). The Alaska Gable Shelters are 
designed to be light and compact for rapid deployment, quick setup, and improved 
transportability. (Initial training for these structures is provided by Alaska Structures.)  
When assembled, the Alaska Gable Shelter measures 18 ft (5.5 m) wide and is 9 ft (2.7 
m) at its apex, and is available in multiple lengths. The standard shelter is 18 ft x 26 ft 
(5.5 m x 7.9m), weighs 620 lb (281.2 kg), and can be fully operational in fewer than 15 
minutes with six trained personnel.  During our visit to NSWC in San Diego, the Seabees 
who set up the camps for NSW said it took three or four men about .5–.75 hours to set up 
a tent with structuring, wiring, liner, etc. The Alaska Gable Shelters have a 20-year shelf 
life and are designed for up to 10 years of extended use in the field (Structures, Alaska 
Structures, 2011).  
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Figure 5.   Alaska Gabled Structures 
The second option we looked at by Alaska is called the Alaska Small Shelter 
System (AKSS). This shelter is 20 ft wide x 32.5 ft long x 10 ft high (6.1 m wide x 9.9 m 
long x 3 m high) and is soft sided.  The AKSS can be connected end-to-end, side-to-side, 
or end-to-side to create multi-shelter complexes. All AKSSs come with a cover system, 
complete insulation system, a non-slip floor, a 30 in. x 80 in. (76 cm x 203.2 cm) hard 
door, four windows, plenum, an incandescent light string, and a quick-connect electrical 
harness with 24 outlets (Structures, Alaska Structures Small Shelter System, 2011). 
Additional standard features of the AKSS models include side windows, side entries, and 
stovepipe flanges. 
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In terms of their ability to withstand environmental conditions, Alaska Structures’ 
soft-sided shelters, both the gable roof system and the AKSS, far exceed the requirements 
we received from the NSHQ for wind and snow loads. The gable-roof system can 
withstand snow loads of up to 125 lb/sq ft (56.7 kg/m2), and it tested successfully for 
wind loads of up to 120 mph (193 km/h). The AKSS successfully withstood 70 mph 
(112.7 km/h) wind loads with 80 mph (128.75 km/h) gusts, and it also successfully meet 
a 20 lb/sq ft (9 kg; PSF) snow load (Structures, Alaska Structures, 2011). 
Both the gable structure and the AKSS can be customized with entry vestibules 
that can help reduce dust entry into the shelter as well as reducing light exposure at night, 
a functionality that meets the light restrictions stated previously. Additional options that 
are available for both shelters include containers, one-piece liners, fluorescent lights, 
European lighting and electrical distribution systems, and generators. Both styles of 
structures were used operationally, and the structures’ capabilities and quick erect 
systems were noted during OEF and OIF and were reported to far exceed the 
requirements imposed by the Air Force, Army, USSOCOM, and the British Mod in 
extreme heat, wind, and sand (Structures, Alaska Structures, 2011). The users at several 
Fort Bragg commands were extremely happy with the overall operation of the Alaska 
Structure products, especially with their transportability (Figure 6), ease of setup, 
durability, and comfort. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Transporting the AKSS (Alaska Structures) 
Transporting the AKSS 
 41” wide x 102” long x 49” high 
 104 cm wide x  259 cm long x  
124.5 cm high 
 One complete Alaska Small Shelter 
per container 
 Four containers per 463 L pallet 
position 
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Alaska has also developed two new energy-efficient products that will 
significantly reduce the carbon footprint of base camps, decreasing the amount of fuel 
required to heat and cool any Alaska Shelter. These new eco-friendly systems are 
available for all Alaska Shelter models, and they are called Enerlayer and Alaska Solar 
Fly (Figure 7). The first Alaska Enerlayer sits in between the outer cover and inner liner 
of the structure. With the Enerlayer installed, there is a 35% reduction in the heat 
required to maintain a 70 °F (21 °C) interior temperature at -25 °F (-32 °C) ambient 
temperature, a 22% reduction in the air conditioning required to maintain a 70 °F (21 °C) 
interior temperature at +125 °F (52 °C) ambient temperature, a further 33% reduction in 
the air conditioning required when used in conjunction with AKS Solar Fly. These 
systems save up to 2,650 gal (10,031 L) of fuel per year (per shelter/5-ton ECU; 
Structures, Enerlayer Alaska Structures). 
Alaska Structures also offers a variety of Environmental Control Units (ECUs), 
including a 2.5-ton unit, a 5-ton unit, and a 10-ton unit. Each Alaska ECU is available in 
either a U.S. version (3-ph, 208V, 60Hz) or an EU version (1-ph, 230V, 50Hz). AKS also 
offers a 5-ton split system for NBC applications.  Alaska’s ECUs come with forklift 
pockets on all four sides, one set of 36-in. long insulated ducts, a 25-ft power cable with a 
U.S. military cannon plug connector, and a 60-day spares/repair kit.  Alaska ECU options 
include wheels kits, various lengths of insulated ducts, and remote control units 




Figure 7.   AKSS Shelters with Solar Fly (Alaska Structures) 
Alaska Structures provides 24/7 emergency customer service, technical support, 
and product information via phone, e-mail, or on location.  Most spare and replacement 
parts are shipped within 24 hours to locations around the world. 
B. HDT GLOBAL BASE-X AND AIR BEAM STRUCTURES 
Headquartered in Solon, Ohio, HDT Global is the manufacturer of the Base-X 
shelters. We studied their products, which are used by the U.S. and NATO military units, 
civilian governments, and commercial customers around the world. We observed the 
Base-X structures at the U.S. Marine Corps 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) unit at 
Camp Pendleton, CA, and at NSWC in San Diego, CA.  A key characteristic of Base-X 
shelters is their lightweight folding frame, specifically developed to reduce the setup time 
of this tactical soft-walled shelter system. (Initial training for this system is provided by 
HDT Global.)  The folding frame design gives the system its strength and helps in the 
ease of setup. The system has the strength required to meet specifications, and the 
lightweight frame keeps the system to a minimum in weight and size, while still making 
it mobile and easy to deploy.  The folding frame shelters range in size from personal tents 
to corps-level command and control (C2) complexes.  
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Figure 8.   HDT Base-X® Model 307 Shelter Specifications (HDT Global) 
The HDT Base-X® Model 307 (Figure 8) is a mid-sized shelter with an interior 
clear span of 18-ft wide x 35-ft long (5.49 m x 10.67m) with eight entry and egress 
points. This shelter houses 14-18 personnel, and it could also be used for mid-sized 
command and control (C2), medical, communication, logistics operations, and private 
offices. The Base-X® Model 307 comes as a sleeping kit (Part# 60307GPSLP-KTTN) 
(Figure 9), which consists of the following components: 
1. 1-307 Ready-Fold Flooring 
 2. Two Light Kits (set of two)  
 3. Ready-Roll Flooring 
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Figure 9.   Model 307 Ready-Fold Floor (HDT Global) 
The 307 has electrical outlets every five ft (1.5 m) and hang points every five ft 
(1.5 m) that can hold up to a 100-lb (45.4 kg) weight-load at each point (Global, HDT 
Base-X Model 307, 2011). It has an integral liner with floor and HVAC plenum, a 
relatively low weight, and cubic size.  In addition, the personnel requirements for setup 
and field maintenance are minimal. This shelter is also energy efficient when utilizing the 
HDT Solar Shade Fly (Figure 10) which provides an additional layer of solar protection, 
reducing shelter interior temperatures and temperature gradients, and lowering the fuel 
consumption associated with environmental control. Use of the Shade Fly with HDT’s 
shelters has been proven to reduce internal shelter temperatures by 10–18 °F (5.5–10 °C; 
Global, Shade Fly, 2010). 
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Figure 10.   HDT Global Solar Shade Fly (HDT Global) 
HDT’s radiant barrier (Figure 10), which helps to improve conductive, 
convective, and radiant heat transfer, a beneficial feature to have in some of the extreme 
climates of the world where military forces deploy.  Both of these barriers can help 
reduce the amount of energy required to heat and/or cool these shelters as well as to 
reduce the logistical burden on the deployed forces. Both barriers were tested by HDT 
and they claim that the new barrier lowers the shelter’s interior temperatures by 10–18 °F 
(5.5–10 °C) in non-ECU cooled shelters, and it lowers the temperature gradients up to 
63% in non-ECU cooled shelters. In addition, having these energy efficient products 
installed on the shelters reduces ECU run times to 70% below normal, thus reducing fuel 
consumption. The ECU-cooled shelters are up to 10.8 °F (6 °C) cooler when using the 
Shade Fly (Global, HDT Shade Fly, 2011).  The radiant barrier is currently being used in 
the field by the Marines. 
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As a possible standalone operation, energy sources and supply line management 
are critical to consider, and HDT had some interesting options to offer in the use of 
alternative energy sources. One option of particular interest is their expeditionary power-
grid management technology that makes the most of every watt, distributing power 
efficiently throughout the camp to where it is needed and conserving it when it’s not. The 
HDT Balance of Systems (BOS)1, shown in Figure 11, utilizes this technology to manage 
the distribution of power harvested from alternative energy resources, such as solar, shore 
power, and generator power. In addition, the BOS can interface with tactical vehicle 
power via a NATO connector from the battery of a tactical vehicle.  The battery array, 
(Figure 11) can be added in series for increased generator run time (Global, HDT Balance 














                                                 
1 This item and the technical data and defense services directly related to this item are subject to the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 CFR § 120–130 and may not be exported to any 
foreign destination or any foreign entity or foreign national, inside or outside the United States, without 























Figure 12.   Balance of System Characteristics (Global, HDT Balance of Systems, 2011) 
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Figure 13.   HDT Alternate Energy Solution (HDT Global) 
C. AIR-SUPPORTED TEMPER HDT AIR BEAM STRUCTURE 
Another shelter option from HDT is their high-pressure Air Beam Structure, 
(Figure 14).  The Air Beam Structure has several key advantages as a shelter system, 
which includes its strength, durability, rapid deployment capability, and minimal 
manpower requirements.  Another key benefit is the low life cycle cost for each unit due 
to the small logistics chain and parts count.  The durability of these shelters has been 
demonstrated in nearly 200 consecutive Air Beam shelter erection-strike cycles without 
incident.  The Air Beam- series shelters come in three models that are 21-ft (6.4 m) long 
and four models that are 32-ft (9.8 m) long.  These models have identical 10-in. (25.4 cm) 
diameters and a 20-ft (6.1 m) clear span.  Standard models range in size from 430–640 sq 
ft (131.1–195.1 m2) and are offered in a variety of configurations.  The Army selected the 
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HDT Air Beam Shelter (Air Supported temper types) for Force Provider, their premier 
base camp (Global, HDT Global Air Beam Shelter System, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 14.   HDT Air Beam Shelter System (HDT Global) 
We did not personally see the Air Beam setup at any of the sites we visited, but, 
based on the idea and concept, we expect this system would be user friendly and easy to 
deploy and erect.  The shelter is laid out and staked to the ground at just four anchor 
positions. The AirBeams are then inflated simultaneously with a commercial air 
compressor that comes with the package. The company states that two people can deploy 
the shelter in fewer than ten minutes. The shelter is deployed and struck with the 
prepositioned inflation hoses. The Air Beam’s specific characteristics include the 
following: weight (including the compressor) is 646 lb (293 kg); packed volume is 6.9 cu 
yd (5.3 m3); wind load is 64.4 mph (103.7 km/h); and snow load is 10 lb/sq ft (4.5kg/m; 
Global, HDT Global Air Beam Shelter System, 2011). 
HDT Global provides 24/7 customer service, technical support, and product 
information via phone, e-mail, or on location. Most spare and replacement parts are 
shipped within 24 hours to locations around the world. 
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Note. We received these drawings from an HDT Global Sales representative. 
Figure 15.   DRASH Structure System 
D. DRASH STRUCTURE SYSTEM 
DRASH’s headquarters and manufacturing facility is located in Orangeburg, NY. 
Their systems are currently used by all branches of the U.S. military and by the armed 
forces of Australia, Austria, Germany, Israel, Japan, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Turkey, 
and the United Kingdom. More than 17,000 shelters and over 7,500 trailers have been 
deployed worldwide with U.S. and NATO forces (DRASH, DRASH Brochure, 2011). 
We met with representatives from DRASH in Fort Bragg, NC, during an exercise with 
the 82nd Airborne. The 82nd Airborne had its command and control setup for the 
exercise and was in the process of setting up the remaining camp.  
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DRASH uses a soft-walled shelter system solution for command and control, 
medical, life support, logistics, and maintenance facilities. It is a rapidly deployable 
system that requires no special equipment, site preparation, or extensive training (initial 
training is provided).  The shelter can be set up rapidly without the use of special tools. 
DRASH has a patented frame design, composed of what they call Titanite, which makes 
up most of the shelter’s frame.  The Titanite is an aerospace composite that has been 
independently tested, and its flex strength is 270% greater than aluminum’s (DRASH, 
DRASH Brochure, 2011).  
The basic DRASH shelter design consists of a frame with two pre-attached covers 
and a ground cover.  It has a double layer of fabric that helps provide a naturally 
temperature-controlled environment, even without environmental support; however, in 
extreme conditions, this shelter needs environmental support. The command and control 
center at Fort Bragg was comfortable when the outside air temperature was 95 °F 
(35 °C). 
The shelter’s covers are made with XYTEX®, which is a specially coated fabric 
that is fire retardant, mildew resistant, water repellent, and highly resistant to abrasion 
and ultra violet rays. All cover fabrics include blackout in the visual- and near-infrared 
spectrum and meet Mil-Standard requirements for soft-walled shelters (DRASH, DRASH 
Brochure, 2011). The DRASH systems are modular and vary in size from 109–1,250 sq ft 
(33.2–381 m2 ). They can interconnect with each other, regardless of model or series, to 




Figure 16.   DRASH M-Series Specifications (DRASH)
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DRASH has several models to choose from (Figure 16). One of the models we 
observed in the field was from DRASH’s M Series (Figures 15 and 17). The M Series 
shelters include one of DRASH’s military dome tents with an interior width of 18 ft (5.5 
m) and an interior height of 9.7 ft (3 m).  These shelters come in three basic models and 
in varying lengths. In addition, the M Series shelters can be lengthened to increase an 
operating area by removing the shelters’ end caps and adding additional center sections.  
The M Series shelters pack down to less than 2% of their deployed size for easy transport 
(DRASH, DRASH M Series, 2011).  The DRASH M Series shelters can operate in 
temperatures ranging from -50– +131 °F (-45.5–55 °C). The M Series shelters can be 
assembled in approximately 15 minutes with about four to six trained individuals 
(DRASH, DRASH Shelters, 2011). The units at Fort Bragg took slightly longer to set up 
the shelters, because several more junior troops assembled the structures. DRASH had an 
area representative on site, assisting the soldiers and answering questions.  DRASH 
provides 24/7 customer service, technical support, and product information via phone, e-
mail, or on location.  Most spare and replacement parts are shipped within 24 hours to 
locations around the world. 
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Figure 17.   DRASH Series M Style Shelters (DRASH) 
DRASH’s power and environmental controls can be integrated with a Utility 
Support Transport (UST) trailer (Figure 18) that provides a seamless power package and 
environmental control system for deploying in extreme conditions. UST trailer models 
include Genset outputs ranging from 5–33 kW and/or 5-, 8-, or 12-ton Environmental 
Control Units (ECUs) with an integrated strip heater.  The trailer has lift points for sling 
loading by a CH-47. The system is mounted on a large trailer that has both benefits and 
challenges.  
One of the benefits of the system is that it is compact on the trailer, and the trailer 
has additional storage space for other shelters, which makes for easy transport. That is 
also one of the problems with the type of camp we are setting up. The trailer that 
DRASH’s power and environmental control system sits on is very large. This trailer is 
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ideal for a large operation that has semi-trucks delivering equipment to the camp; 
however, without a large vehicle to move the system, the shelters are immobile and 
cannot be moved into an ideal position. This system was designed to operate in an all-
terrain area acceptable for military vehicles and to track behind, but it was not necessarily 
designed to be airdropped into an environment. 
 
 
Figure 18.   DRASH UST Trailer (DRASH) 
If deploying with vehicles, the DRASH UST trailer with the shelters attached 
(Figure 17) can be towed via HMMWV, LMTV, FMTV, or non-tactical vehicles. 
DRASH shelter systems are also certified for transport via military sea vessels and 
aircraft. The shelters can be packed on a 463 L pallet for easy deployment, making them 
flexible for shipping. The DRASH shelters meet all U.S. military standards, and they 
have been tested at the Aberdeen Test Center (ATC) and the Nevada Automotive Testing 
Center (NATC) (Figure 19). 
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 DRASH DURABILITY TESTING 
Test Criteria/Shelter Series S Series XB Series M Series J Series 
Rain 
Able to withstand 2 inches per hour of free falling and blowing 
rain for 30 minutes without intrusion of water into the shelter. 
 PASSED  PASSED  PASSED  PASSED 
Wind 
Able to withstand a steady wind of 55 mph with gusts up to 65 
mph. 
 PASSED  PASSED  PASSED  PASSED 
Temperature 
Able to sustain inside ambient temperatures of +40F to +80F 
within an hour when subjected to extreme high and low 
temperature ranges of -50F to +131F. 
 PASSED  PASSED  PASSED  PASSED 
Durability 
Able to withstand a minimum of 36 erect/strike cycles without 
structural damage. 
 PASSED  PASSED  PASSED  PASSED 
Blackout 
Interior shelter lights not visible during ingress/egress within 
100 meters with the naked eye, or within 300 meters with night 
vision goggles. 
 PASSED  PASSED  PASSED  PASSED 
Snowload 
Able to withstand 10 lbs/sq.ft. of snow load for 12 hours 
without damage while using All Weather Kit. 
 PASSED  PASSED  PASSED  PASSED 
Figure 19.   DRASH Durability Testing Results (DRASH, DRASH Brochure, 2011) 
E. WEATHERHAVEN STRUCTURES 
Weatherhaven corporate headquarters is located in Vancouver, Canada, and the 
company has manufacturing facilities in South Africa and South America. Our team 
visited Weatherhaven’s headquarters and met with their representatives in Vancouver. 
We took a tour of their facilities and viewed many of their products and shelters. The 
company stressed to us that Weatherhaven builds to their customers’ requirements and 
specifications. Their representatives showed us several examples where a customer asked 
Weatherhaven to build an item to meet a certain requirement, and the company’s 
designers and engineers did just that. 
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Figure 20.   Weatherhaven Shelter (Weatherhaven) 
Weatherhaven fabric shelters (Figure 20) and systems can be packaged for 
shipment in standard 20-ft ISO shipping containers or on pallets for cargo aircraft of any 
size.  Weatherhaven shelters do require a few specialty fitted tools for assembling and 
disassembling their shelters. (Initial training is provided by Weatherhaven.)  The 
components of the shelter systems—such as the flooring and the electrical and 
mechanical systems—are also specifically designed to facilitate an easy set-up and 
teardown.  Weatherhaven claims their shelters and systems have been used in the field for 
projects that have lasted 15–20 years (Weatherhaven, Weatherhaven Military Products, 
2011). Weatherhaven’s Modular Tentage System (MTS) comes in a variety of sizes that 
can be connected with other shelters to form larger complexes (Figure 21). The MTS is 
commonly used for accommodation, ablutions, kitchens, laundries, command posts, 
workshops, and medical facilities.  
 53
 
Figure 21.   Weatherhaven MECC and Soft-Sided Shelter (Weatherhaven) 
The Series 4 is another Weatherhaven soft-sided and has been used for over 20 
years by various countries. It is a shelter that is in use worldwide in all climates, 
including polar regions. Weatherhaven’s Solarshade system is similar to the 
environmental control systems that Alaska Structures and Base-X offer. Like the other 
two manufacturers’ systems, the Solarshade is designed to reduce the internal 
temperature within the shelter in extreme environmental conditions. The Solarshade is 
designed to be used in combination with a Weatherhaven shelter when deployed in areas 
of extreme direct solar radiation. The Solarshade also helps to prolong the life of the 
Weatherhaven shelter by reducing its exposure to harmful radiation and solar gain. The 
Solarshades also helps reduce the demand on climate control systems by blocking 





F. HYGIENE SYSTEMS AND KITCHENS 
We consulted several sources to figure out the correct solution for constructing 
hygiene facilities. We received several different answers, and we concluded that it 
depends on the environment the camp deploys to. We received a wide range of solutions, 
everything from a best case scenario (use the facilities already in place in country, such as 
buildings, hangars, etc.) all the way down to a worst case scenarios (digging ditches and 
burning the waste). The options we explored scratch the surface in this area, but, to 
provide an accurate solution, we would have needed to make too many assumptions. The 
ideal hygiene solution must be determined during mission planning, but our options 
provide a good base point to build from and could be deployed in any theater, in any 
circumstances, with the right support.  
1. Alaska Structures Ablutions 
Alaska Structures offers a four-person and a one-person shower system, as shown 
in Figure 22. Their system includes one 20-ft x 19.5-ft (6.1 m x 5.9 m) Alaska Structures 
shelter, one 2.5-ton Alaska Structures FCU, one lighting/electrical kit, one three-basin 
sink, four Alaska Structures shower-in-a-box shower stalls, a hot water heater, a self-
priming pumping system, 2000-gal (7,571 L) potable and grey-water bladders, a 
wastewater drainage pump, a ventilation fan, and a plug- and-play quick-connect hose 
kit. The shower system can handle over 100 showers per day (Structures, Alaska 
Structures Readiness Shelter Systems, 2011). 
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Figure 22.   Alaska Structures Shower System (Alaska Structures) 
2. DRASH Mobile Hygiene System 
The DRASH Mobile Hygiene System includes private shower stalls and a 
common wash area with wash basins and benches.  A rigid-wall containment berm sits on 
the inside perimeter of the shelter to ensure that runoff water is contained within the 
entire system. Raised flooring sits inside the berm, along with a wastewater pump system 
that automatically turns on when water is present and shuts off when the water level is 
below a quarter inch. Water can then be delivered from any fixed, pressurized water 
source, and from a fresh-water bladder or body of water via a pressurized pump system. 
The water can be heated using a diesel water heater. 
The DRASH G2 Water Heating System is a 425,000 BTU, self-heating, 
thermostatically controlled system. One of the benefits of this DRASH water heating 
system is its ability to use multiple fuel sources (diesel, kerosene, home heating oil, and 
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JP4). The system produces a flow rate of up to 28 gallons per minute (106 L per minute) 




Figure 23.   DRASH Hygiene System (DRASH) 
The DRASH shower shelters are composed of fire-retardant, mold- and mildew-
resistant, waterproof covers.  The frame is manufactured from Titanite, and the shelter is 
pre-plumbed into the interior of the shelter frame, making it easier to set up and take 
down. The showers are supplied by 35-ft (10.67 m), abrasion-resistant hoses that connect 
to the water heater. 
3. Weatherhaven Support Facilities 
Even though Weatherhaven has a soft-side shelter version for their ablutions, 
kitchens, and laundry facilities, their hard-side container version is top of the line and the 
best we have seen. In camp applications, the Weatherhaven MECC is commonly used for 
ablutions, kitchens, and laundry facilities. One of the big benefits of the Weatherhaven 
solution is its stainless-steel interior and furnishings, which help maintain a high standard 




include five showers, five toilets, two urinals, one washtub, and six sinks (Figure 24). 





Figure 24.   Weatherhaven Ablution System (Weatherhaven) 
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In 2011, Weatherhaven introduced its new shelter system. It includes the Tactical 
Re-deployable Expanding Container Capability (TRECC-H) and (TRECC-V), which are 
helicopter- and vehicle-based variants, respectively (Figure 25). When we first came 
across the TRECC shelter system it was going through initial testing, it was referred to as 
the SHARC (Specialized Helicopter and Aircraft Re-Deployable Container). The TRECC 
was initially developed and designed for the NSHQ to meet its requirements for being 
able to deploy from the inside of a CH-47 Chinook helicopter. The TRECC (Figure 25) is 
constructed of lightweight aluminum and is deployable via air, road, rail, and sea, and it 
fits within a 20-ft ISO container.  It provides for a secure and weatherproof internal 
payload capacity of 418 cu ft (11.8 m³) and has an internal load capacity of 6500 lb (2900 




Figure 25.   Tactical Re-deployable Expanding Container Capability (TRECC) 
(Weatherhaven) 
When the TRECC is full deployed and open it provides approximately 255 ft² 
(23.7 m²) of working space with a ceiling of 8 ft (2.44m) (Figure 26). The TRECC can be 
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configured as required to include operations rooms, command posts, medical centers, and 
specialist workshops (Weatherhaven, Weatherhaven SHARC Brochure). 
 
Figure 26.   Weatherhaven SHARC Fact Sheet (Weatherhaven SHARC Fact Sheet, 
2011) 
 
Figure 27.   TRECC Being Loaded into the Back of a CH-47 (Weatherhaven) 
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G. MEDICAL FACILITIES 
The next goal of our study was to find the right setup for an SOF medical unit. 
We discovered a wide spectrum of options and varying viewpoints regarding the right 
size and the required structure to treat troops in the field. For example, the Army uses 
hard-sided (containerized) facilities for all of the surgery and clinical care in its combat 
support hospitals (CSH), but it uses tents for wards and sleeping. The Air Force uses tents 
from Alaska Structures for its Expeditionary Medical Facility (EMEDs) (Figure 28). The 
Army also uses tents for its forward surgical teams (FSTs; A. Resnick, personal 
communication, October 19, 2011).2 The four soft-sided shelter systems provided by 
Alaska Structures, Base-X, DRASH, and Weatherhaven are all very similar and offer no 
real distinctions beyond the features we discussed in the SUPCEN section of this report. 
The question is what to use as a medical facility in a rapidly deployable camp? 
  
                                                 







Figure 28.   Soft sided Medical Facilities (DRASH and Alaska Structures) 
 
 62
H. OPTIONAL EQUIPMENT: BOBCAT 
During this study, we looked at options for assisting in the setup and placement of 
a camp and found a few commands were using compact skid loader-type equipment 
(Figure 29) to assist in their operations. We contacted Bobcat Company for information 
on their loaders. Bobcat is not the only manufacturer of skid loader equipment. There are 
others (i.e., Caterpillar and John Deere) who also make good skid-steer loaders. But we 
were not studying who makes the best skid loader; instead, our goal was to make general 
suggestions on the capability available to units. We choose the skid-steer/compact track 
loaders due to their performance, which was based on weight. The heavier the loader, the 
better it performed, because the added weight and extra ground-to-surface contact (from 
the track option and not the wheel option) increase the load capacity. The added loader 
weight gives it better power and performance in difficult soil conditions, a benefit we 
thought was important enough to go with a heavier option. The added size enables the 
loader to push heavier loads in rough terrain, sandy surfaces, and muddy conditions. The 
option we looked at was the Bobcat T770 Compact Track Loader; it was one of the 
largest, but not the largest, option. We looked at its basic weight compared to its 
operating capacity and found its ratio to be better than that of some of the higher end 
models. The T770 comes with a 92 HP diesel engine, Rated Operating Capacity (ROC) 
of 3,475 lb, strong lifting power (up to 11 ft of vertical lift) (Figure 30). 
 




Figure 30.   Bobcat T770 Compact Truck Loader Specifications (Bobcat, 2011) 
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I. OPCEN (OPERATIONS CENTER) COMMAND AND CONTROL 
CENTER SHELTERS: ALASKA STRUCTURES COMMAND AND 
CONTROL 
Alaska Structures has a couple of different options for their Tactical Operations 
Centers (TOCs), from their expeditionary command and control center unit which utilizes 
the 18-ft wide or 20-ft wide Alaska Gable Shelters. They also have larger systems 
available for division-sized TOCs or Joint Special Operational Task Force Headquarters 
that offer over 10,000 sq ft of floor space (Figure 31). The tentage systems used for the 
TOCs utilizes the same features as the life-support shelters. Shown in Figure 30, they are 
soft-sided shelter systems that can expand out with corridors for the different departments 
in the TOC. The system we observed was spacious, and it was easy to set up as an 
effective command and control center. We highly recommend this system. 
 
 






J. HDT GLOBAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM 
 
Figure 32.   HDT Global Command and Control System (HDT Global) 
The HDT Global/Base-X Command and Control system also utilizes soft-side 
structures and comes in various sizes to meet the C2 requirements of the unit (Figure 32). 
When studying HDT’s display packages, we discovered some interesting options. The 
HDT Expeditionary Systems Video Display System (VDS) weighs approximately 88 lb 
(39.92 kg), including the carrying case. The company claims the system can be up and 
running in fewer than five minutes, but we were unable to see their VDSs on our visits. 
The VDS is fully compatible and immediately employable with unit legacy systems and 
equipment. HDT appears to have a robust training support team available to help set up 
and operate their equipment. Their training team offers complete operator training on all 
new equipment, with continuous training for rotating troops. Training for in-field 
maintenance and repairs is also provided. HDT support staff members are strategically 
located to provide 24-hour emergency support; on-site warranty service and parts 
replacement; in-field support during training and exercises; and global in-field support 
during deployment (Global, 2011). 
HDT has a Digital Control Unit (DCU) (Figure 33) that controls video and audio 
feeds from various sources to multiple outputs and is quad-screen capable. The DCU is  
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contained in a single shock-mounted transport case, complete with all cables and modules 
to expand system capabilities. Components are customized to support specific mission 




Figure 33.   HDT Digital Control Unit (DCU) (HDT Global) 
The HDT Video Display System uses a projector with the shortest throw in the 
world. The free-standing screen and projector device are fewer than 26 in. (66 cm) apart. 
The system is idea for smaller spaces as it takes up a lot less floor space than other video 
systems and eliminates any sight-line obstruction in the field of view to the screen.  The 
system is lighter and faster to set up than traditional overhead frame systems. Another 
nice feature is that the whole projector system can be set up in fewer than five minutes. 
The VDS comes in two sizes, small and large. 
HDT has another interesting product option available. Although this option is not 
necessarily required, it could be useful. It is their Interactive Video Display System 
(IVDS) (Figures 34 and 35), which allows the user to write and draw on the screen 
surface, enabling digital capture of content from the screen to a computer. 
 
DCU basic characteristics:  
•Video and audio run over CAT5/6 cable 
•Up to 32 inputs and 16 outputs over one 
system  
•Accessible control from any computer 
on your network 
•HTML interface requires no special 
software 
•Available touchscreen interface  
•Supports digital DVI and analog VGA 
•Dimensions 28.25 in. D x 29 in. W x 
26.25 in. H 71.76 cm D x 73.66 cm W x 
66.68 cm H 






Figure 34.   HDT Interactive Video Display System (HDT Global) 
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Figure 35.   HDT Global VDS Fact Sheet (HDT Global) 
HDT’s C2 chairs and tables (Figure 36) seem to be heavier than some of the other 
manufacturers’, but they appear to be sturdier and more rugged.  Each chair weighs 11.5 
lb and can support up to 800 lb of distributed weight. They are made of hardened 
polycarbonate plastic and 18-gauge oval steel tubing. For storage or transport, the chairs 
are stacked four high (6-in. height) in a mildew-resistant storage bag. The HDT table 
seems to be a rugged table with no special features, except that it comes with a cable 
management bag that hangs over the end of the table for keeping the cables neat and 




Figure 36.   HDT’s C2 Tables and Chairs 
K. DRASH COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM 
The DRASH system (Figure 38), utilizes the same basic shelters used in their life 
support system.  Their command and control centers are widely used by the Army as part 
of the Army’s Standard Integrated Command Post System (SICPS). The system 
incorporates the Trailer Mounted Support System (TMSS) Medium and Large Systems 
(Figure 37) which includes the shelter, power, environmental control and tactical 
mobility which makes up the complete command operation center.  One of the better 
features we observed was a tactical platform system, which is a two-tier platform that 
really enhanced the visibility and functionality for all of the users in the TOC. The 
platform system we observed came from a company out of Vermont called Bike Track, 
Inc. They also provided the hard flooring systems in the DRASH shelters we observed. 
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Figure 37.   DRASH Trailer Mounted Support System (TMSS) and Optional Shipping 
Container (DRASH) 
DRASH’s Medium Command and Control System (Figure 38) provides 
approximately 442 sq ft of usable space for command, control, and communications on 
the battlefield. The SICPS TMSS Medium System measures 26.6 ft long and 18 ft wide, 
and includes two end sections that can be removed to add additional center sections to 
increase the total length of the shelter. The Medium System can be packed on a 
HMMWV-towable DRASH trailer with an 18-kW power source and a 5-ton 
Environmental Control Unit to cool the inside of the shelter. The SICPS TMSS Medium 
System can be set up in about an hour, according to the soldiers we talked with. The 
Medium System can be set up with approximately four people and does not require any 
assembly or special equipment to either erect it or take it down.  When operational, this 
DRASH system can withstand extreme weather conditions, such as blowing rain and high  
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wind. The SICPS TMSS Medium System can also sustain ambient temperatures of 40–




Figure 38.   DRASH Command and Control Center(DRASH) 
The other option DRASH offers for a command and control system is the 
DRASH Trailer Mounted Support System (TMSS) Large (Figure 39). With the TMSS 
Large, the shelter system provides more than 1,120 sq ft of usable space for command, 
control, and communications on the battlefield. The SICPS TMSS Large System 
measures 51.4 ft long and 31.33 ft wide, and comes with either a regular end section or an 
optional maintenance door. It is packed on to an FMTV-towable DRASH trailer with 33 
kW of power and a 12-ton Environmental Control Unit to cool the inside of the shelter. 
The trailer also provides the means to set up or take down the shelter via an inflatable air 
bladder. To erect the shelter, the trailer is tilted so that the shelter can be positioned above 
a low-pressure air blower and bladder, which pushes the shelter up from below. The 
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entire process takes approximately 45 minutes and requires a minimal number of 
experienced personnel. Like the Medium, the SICPS TMSS Large is also operable in 
extreme weather conditions, such as blowing rain and high wind. It is also able to sustain 
ambient temperatures of +40–87 °F when subjected to extreme high and low temperature 
ranges of -50 to +131 °F. DRASH’s SICPS TMSS Systems are currently being fielded to 
all Army maneuver brigade combat teams, including units in Iraq and Afghanistan. This 
system might be too large for a rapidly deployable SOF Headquarters, but could be a 
viable option for an operation with less restrictive requirements.   
 
 
Figure 39.   DRASH Large Command and Control Center (DRASH) 
L. THE WEATHERHAVEN COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM 
The only hard-sided shelter option we looked at is manufactured by 
Weatherhaven. Other hard-sided options are available, but Weatherhaven’s shelter is 
currently used by the NSHQ, which currently has nine MECCs in its inventory, and we 
viewed interoperability and standardization as key factors.  We looked at both the MECC 
(Figure 40), for its compatibility, and the TRECC (Figures 41 and 42), because it was 
specifically built to NSHQ specifications. The benefits of a hard-sided shelter are 
obvious. Not only is the shelter itself ready to ship in its own container, but all of the 
equipment that will be used in the command center is now also self-contained within the 
container. The Weatherhaven hard-sided option is an expandable container shelter where 
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the sides fold down, making the container 1/3 the size of a standard command and control 
trailer.  It provides a living and working space that is three times larger than its shipping 
footprint. In its packed configuration, the MECC (Figure 32) is a certified ISO container, 
and nine units can be stacked on top of each other when outfitted with a steel core. With 
the aluminum version of the MECC, three units can be stacked on top of each other. The 
MECC can be transported anywhere in the world by road, rail, sea, or air. 
 
Figure 40.   Weatherhaven MECC (Weatherhaven) 
One of the stated features of the Weatherhaven hard-sided structures includes the 
ability to pre-wire and pre-plumb fixed mechanical and electrical systems, which helps 
facilitate rapid on-site setup. The setup time varies, but the manufacturer states it takes 
two experienced people 10–15 minutes to set up the MECC. A unit we visited that was 
using the MECC stated that it took four to six people about an hour to build and complete 
the system. The MECC comes in two standard sizes: 8-ft wide x 8-ft high x 20-ft long 
and 8-ft wide x 8-ft, 6-in high x 20-ft long. The MECC is insulated for hot or cold 
climates.  The MECC allows various-sized interconnector kits and vestibules to be added 
end-to-end and side-to-side to create larger complexes. The MECC can be set up on the 
ground, linked to a vehicle, or mounted on a trailer. It can also be outfitted with collective 
protection equipment when nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare are a threat. 
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Figure 41.   Weatherhaven TRECC (Weatherhaven) 
As we stated earlier, the internal equipment is stored and transported in the center 
core of the MECC and TRECC, and this equipment does not need to be removed from 
the unit for shipping; thus, sensitive electronic equipment is not exposed to the outside 
elements.  Weatherhaven allows for customizing electrical packages with outlets for 
radios, computers, and other required equipment. Another nice feature of the MECC is 
that, when space is an issue, it can be used with a stacking kit that allows the units to be 
deployed on top of each other. The kit consists of a stairway with platform support, a 
roof, and six extended wing supports. 
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Figure 42.   Weatherhaven TRECC (Weatherhaven) 
M. SPEC OPS, INC. (SOI) 
The last company we looked at for the OPCEN piece was Spec Ops, Inc. (SOI). 
They are a company out of Ashland, VA. They specialize in command and control 
systems that range in size from two-person operators to brigade-level operations. They 
have deployed over 30,000 products worldwide. Their customers include all branches of 
the U.S. military, U.S. intelligence services, U.S. homeland security, and municipality-
level emergency responders. One of the SF units at Fort Bragg told us about SOI and how 
good their equipment was. Unfortunately, we did not have time to visit them or a unit that 
used their equipment; however, after researching their products, we felt it was important 
to include them in our discussion of possible OPCEN solutions. 
SOI currently offers over 100 commercially available command and control 
products. They also design new systems based on customer-specific requirements. A few 
of the items we looked into were their tactical displays. One of these displays is called 
Megawall (Figure 43) and is a projector-based, soft-edged blended video display for 
powerful, high resolution images. A single image from each projector is blended to create 
one desktop background picture. Multiple display windows are then overlaid onto the 




Figure 43.   SOI’s Megawall Options (Spec Ops, Inc.) 
The Megawalls might be too large for most applications, but SOI has another 
good option available: the Rapid Tactical Operation Center (RTOC) (Figures 44 and 45). 
The RTOC are large-screen displays that are mounted on a durable, lightweight 
aluminum framework. All components set up and strike quickly, and they fit within their 
own weatherproof, ruggedized aluminum case. All RTOCs are one- to two-person 
portable. The RTOC C4ISR Platforms are ideal for displaying computer application data, 
UAV surveillance feeds, network TV, and other communication feeds. The RTOCs vary 
in size; they start at 3 ft x 4 ft and increase up to 3 ft x 12 ft. RTOC video display options 
include projectors (standard and high resolution), plasma, LCD, and now LED. RTOCs 
also support many types of interactive technologies, such as SMART Boards, table-top 
Smart Podiums, and DLP Interactive Projectors with wireless pens. Multiple images on 
one display are possible by adding a Video Distribution Unit (VDU) to the RTOC. These 
multiple images can be moved and resized to maximize the amount of information 
displayed on the screen. The RTOCs can also receive data and images directly from the 














Figure 45.   SOI’s Rapid Tactical Operation Center (RTOC) (Spec Ops, Inc.) 
SOI’s Video Distribution Units (VDU) (Figure 46), offers operators the ability to 
take images from many different video inputs and project them to any number of 
displays. Video outputs are moved between displays by a front panel, button interface, or 
they can be moved using SOI’s AV Commander Software. The VDU is mounted inside a 
rugged, transportable, and weather-resistant case. VDUs support multiple display types, 
including projectors, monitors, and TVs. Typical video switches are configured for eight 
inputs x eight outputs, and they can be configured for up to 32 x 32.   The VDUs can 
support VGA, DVI, Twisted Pair, Fiber, Composite, HDMI, etc. (Inc, 2011). 
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Figure 46.   SOI’s Video Distribution Units (VDU), (Spec Ops, Inc.) 
 
 SOI’s Tactical Smart Tables (Figure 47), seem to be some of the best options we 
have come across. According to SOI’s website (SOI, 2011), these tables include the 
following features: 
Made from lightweight, rugged aluminum, all tables are prewired for 
power, secure and unsecure data, voice and video. Standard Tactical 
Tables offer two separate, switched GB networks channeled within the 
table. With pre-wiring and daisy-chain capabilities SOI's Tactical Tables 
significantly reduce cable management issues and control reconfiguration 
costs in both deployable and fixed TOCs/EOCs. SOI also offers Gigabit 





Figure 47.   SOI Tactical Smart Tables 
The Standard Tactical Tables come in lengths of five and six ft, and also include a 
corner table. Aluminum Tactical Cases hold three tables, or two tables and four standard 
chairs. Figure 48 shows the specifications for these tables. 
 
 




N. ALL-SOURCE CENTER (ASC):  SOCC’S INTELLIGENCE FUSION 
CELL 
Fusion of intelligence gathering and sharing across government agencies and 
among allied nations has become a major priority.  Strides to improve intelligence gaps 
have been made since the beginning of the Global War on Terror.  All U.S. SOF task 




Figure 49.   All Source Center (ASC) (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 2007) 
Intelligence fusion is defined as:  
The process of collecting and examining information from all available 
sources and intelligence disciplines (Figure 48 identifies these disciplines) 
to derive as complete an assessment as possible of detected activity.  
Intelligence fusion draws on the complementary strengths of all 
intelligence disciplines, and relies on an all-source approach to 
intelligence collection and analysis.  Fusion relies on collection and 
analysis efforts that optimize the strengths and minimize the weaknesses 
of different intelligence disciplines.  Information is sought from the widest 
possible range of sources to avoid any bias that can result from relying on 
a single source of information and to improve the accuracy and 
completeness of intelligence.  The collection of information from multiple 
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sources is essential to countering the adversary’s operations security and 
deception operations.  The operations of all collection sources must be 
synchronized and coordinated to allow cross-cueing and tip-off among 
collectors.  All-source, fused intelligence results in a finished intelligence 
product that provides the most accurate and complete picture possible of 
what is known about an activity.  While the level of detail in single-source 
reports may be sufficient to meet narrowly defined customer needs, fused 
reports are essential to gain an in-depth understanding. Because the 
adversary will engage in deception efforts, analysts should guard against 
placing unquestioned trust in a single-source intelligence report.  (JP 2-0, 
Joint Intelligence, 2007)  
 
 
Figure 50.   Intelligence Disciplines, Subcategories, and Sources (JP 2-0, Joint 
Intelligence, 2007) 
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The ASC must be capable of managing large amounts of data.  The requirements 
of the data management for the ASC can be broken down into three basic areas or 
categories:  satellite communications (SATCOM) bandwidth, data storage, and 
processing speed. 
1. SATCOM Bandwidth 
The ASC will be utilizing most of the Special Operations Command Component’s 
(SOCC) bandwidth.  The ASC’s bandwidth consumption includes the following 
components: 
1. Full-motion video (FMV) from the intelligence surveillance 
reconnaissance (ISR) feeds; 
2. High-resolution imagery files; 
3. Large target intelligence package (TIP) files—usually containing large 
images, more imagery, maps, video, etc.; and 
Reach-back capability—communicating to host command, higher headquarters, 
or larger intelligence fusion centers, which will allow the ability to communicate by voice 
or post office protocol video teleconferencing (Pop-VTC), as well as transmitting large 
data files that contain satellite imagery, HUMINT files, power, etc. This capability 
requires significant amounts of bandwidth over a network. 
The number of ISR assets, the size of the files transmitted, and the frequency of 
transmission will drive the requirement for SATCOM bandwidth.  Additionally, the way 
in which operations are conducted can also drive SATCOM bandwidth requirements.  
For example, if the SOCC must reach back for support in terms of satellite imagery, 
target analysis, etc., then this may drive larger SATCOM bandwidth requirements than if 
imagery was preloaded into computers or servers that are part of the organic SOCC 
package that is fielded with the advance party. 
NSHQ requires each Special Operation Task Group (SOTG) to be able to monitor 
up to two ISR feeds at one time.  NSHQ also requires that the SOCC is capable of 
monitoring up to 12 ISR feeds at one time.  As mentioned earlier, ISR feeds are one of 
 84
the largest consumers of SATCOM bandwidth.  The SATCOM bandwidth must also 
support the SOCC HQ (75–150 personnel) and six SOTG’s (30–60 personnel each).  
NSHQ’s initial estimate of its SATCOM bandwidth requirement is for a meshed network 
with a total of 38 Mbps over a joint operations area (JOA) and six Mbps dedicated for 
reach back.   Figure 51, illustrates this bandwidth estimate which includes four Mbps for 
each SOTG (one Mbps for each of the two ISR feeds, two Mbps for PoP-VTC, voice 
over internet protocol [VOIP], e-mail, and web); 14 Mbps for the SOCC (one Mbps for 
each of the 12 ISR feeds; two Mbps for Pop-VTC, VOIP, e-mail, and web; two Mbps for 




Figure 51.   Estimated SATCOM Bandwidth Consumption. (Table built based on 
information provided by NSHQ) 
SATCOM bandwidth is very expensive, and it is not getting any cheaper. 
The U.S. Defense Department in recent months has seen price increases as 
great as 300 percent for commercial satellite communications.  Military 
customers experienced ‘sticker shock’ as task orders for bandwidth and 
managed network services expired and were replaced with new orders—
reflecting current market prices—awarded under the recently established 
Future Comsatcom Services Acquisition (FCSA) contract. (Brinton, 2011) 
In our research, we found that bandwidth consumption is far more complex than 
assigning a few Mbps here and there.  Several variables determine bandwidth 
consumption, such as the types of frequency bands, satellites, equipment, computer 









hardware and software, encryption, number of bits, etc.  Many of these variables fall 
outside the scope of our research.  Because the ASC will be utilizing the majority of the 
bandwidth, our goal is to identify the largest drivers of bandwidth, illustrated in Figure 
52, and suggest some simple solutions to use the bandwidth more efficiently. 
 
 
Figure 52.   Typical Bandwidth Consumption Rates Spectrum. (Graph developed from 
information gathered from multiple sources) 
To gain a better understanding of the factors that determine bandwidth usage, our 
research team visited the following sites:  Support Activity One (SUPACT 1), which is 
Naval Special Warfare Group One’s (NSWG-1) intelligence ASC command and NSWG-
1’s mobile communication’s team (MCT).  These units suggested two alternatives to cut 
down on SATCOM bandwidth usage.  The first, as we mentioned earlier, involves 
preloading as much data (i.e., imagery, TIPs, etc.) pertaining to the area of operation 
(AOR) as possible onto storable hard drives.  Intelligence analysts require detailed 
satellite imagery and pictures to conduct their analyses.  The level of detail, the size of 
the file, and the time it takes to send and receive the file on a network are correlated. 
Preloading as much satellite imagery and pictures will save time and bandwidth 
consumption.  The second alternative is to utilize the global broadcast service (GBS).  











The GBS leverages commercial direct broadcast satellite technology to deliver critical 
information to the nation's warfighters (Raytheon, 2011).  It will eat up less bandwidth 
because it acts as what could be termed, “DirectTV for the warfighter,” in that it is a 
receive-only technology that streams data and video through your broadband 
communications link, but at a smaller fraction of bandwidth because you do not need the 
same amount of bandwidth to transmit and receive.  GBS offers a DoD wideband asset 
that provides both classified and unclassified high data rate, direct broadcast to military 
members worldwide.  NATO is also planning to launch a Satellite Broadcast Service 
(SBS) as a counterpart to the U.S. Global Broadcast Service  (NATO, 2003). 
Windmill International, Inc. provides commercial off-the-shelf GBS packages that 
would be ideal for NSHQ.  Table 2 illustrates the pricing packages that Windmill has to 
offer. 
The system is made up of two key components, the Receive Terminal 
(RT) and the Receive Broadcast Manager (RBM).  The Receive Terminal 
includes the antenna/positioner, integral Integrated Receiver Decoder, an 
accessory kit for the RT, shipped in a hard-sided airline rolling bag 
suitable for checked baggage.  The RBM consists of a PC, standard 
windows software, FazzT software, and interconnect and power supply 
cables.  This is shipped in a hard-sided rolling case suitable for airline 
carry-on.  Total system weight in the cases is 78lbs.  The system is 
designed to be hand carried – the RT can be carried over-the-shoulder or 
by hand and outside its transit case it meets airline carryon luggage 
requirements. The PC, and any needed cables, can be carried separately in 
a standard briefcase or computer bag. Total system weight in this hand-




Table 2.   Commercial Pricing for Windmill GBS. (www.windmill-intl.com) 
2. Data Storage 
 
Table 3.   Imagery File Size Spectrum(satimagingcorp.com) 
Large volumes of data storage are necessary to house the working and reference 
files necessary to support operations.  Table 3 shows the many variables and the wide 
spectrum in imagery file size.  As an illustration, if a mission requires 10 images and each 
image averages 800 MB, then data storage for satellite imagery alone will require 8 GB 
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of space.  In addition to storage for imagery, HUMINT operations require large volumes 
of data storage for various file types (i.e., images, text, audio, and video) for one 
particular source or target; such files can require gigabytes of storage space.  In addition, 
working files need to be stored on site, and these also include image files, large 
databases, text and rich text format, briefings, audio, and video.  All of these different 
capabilities, taken together, require several terabytes of storage.  We realize that as data 
compression technology becomes better and more available, storage requirements could 
go down.  However, our experience has shown that as more new technologies are fielded 
on the battlefield, such as Lighthouse3 and the Biometric Analysis Tracking System 
(BATS)4 (Figure 53), other intelligence gathering and analysis tools and data, etc., the 
demand for storage is more likely to increase than to decrease.  Further, data storage 
technologies are becoming cheaper and smaller every day. 
 
                                                 
3 Lighthouse is a revolutionary technology innovation system for smart phones, capable of quickly 
mapping elements in the human terrain, such as tribes, family, links, livelihood, basic necessities 
consumption, and customs. 
 
4 The Biometric Analysis Tracking System uses thumbprints and facial and retinal scans to identify 
foreign persons of interest to human intelligence and counterintelligence personnel. 
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Figure 53.   The Biometric Analysis Tracking System, left (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 
2007) and Lighthouse Main Menu, right. (Image provided by Naval Post 
Graduate School Core Lab) 
3. Processing Speed 
Processing speed is critical for operating large database programs that include 
social network analysis software such as Palantir5 (Figure 54) which manipulate large 
                                                 
5 “Palantir empowers decision-makers at every level by providing them with a robust analytics 
platform that displays, organizes, stores, and analyzes the complex fabric of friendly, threat, neutral and 
clandestine human terrain in a multi-dimensional environment. 
1. Save thousands of man hours. Palantir allows you to see all of your data, from many systems, in 
a single place and automates hundreds of tasks that analysts currently do manually. Search through 
all your data at high speed to pull out significant intelligence. 
2. Palantir’s power allows organizations to make discoveries that would otherwise be impossible 
to make even with 10x the manpower. Palantir’s advanced analytical functionality not only 
reveals important connections, but allows users to share in real time so that a unit’s discovery is 
automatically shared with the larger organization and stored for future retrieval. 
Units obtain the intelligence they need immediately, instead of waiting for it to be disseminated 
down (automatically controlled to their authorization and clearance level). Democratized intelligence 
makes the whole organization smarter and more effective.” (palantirtech.com/government/defense) 
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databases and other files to rapidly analyze tactical information obtained from the 
battlefield so that the information and knowledge may be utilized for follow-on missions 
and targets.  The ability to do this better and faster than the enemy is what provides the 
SOCC with its ability to establish and maintain intelligence dominance.  Therefore, 
purchasing machines with the highest processing speeds, dictated by the latest 
technology, is highly recommended.  
 
 
Figure 54.   Images from Palantir Intelligence Analysis Software 
(palantirtech.com/government/defense) 
O. THE BATTLEFIELD INFORMATION COLLECTION AND 
EXPLOITATION SYSTEMS (BICES) 
BICES is the U.S.’s designated system for intelligence sharing with NATO and 
the NATO member nations.  The diagram in Figure 54 illustrates how BICES operations 
are centered at RAF Molesworth, UK (Joint Analysis Center) and are extended to Kabul, 
Tampa, Hawaii, and Washington, D.C.  U.S. BICES provides NATO Secret with 
connectivity to all U.S. Combatant Commands (COCOMs), Services, and many agencies.  
The U.S. BICES framework (services and capabilities) acts as an extension to all the 
COCOMs.  In addition, there is heavy NATO usage of BICES, because several non-
NATO nations make use of it to share information with NATO nations and to obtain 
releasable information.  In addition to access to nationally released intelligence products, 
BICES provides intelligence tools that can be used for analysis and operations planning. 
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Figure 55.   BICES Network Diagram (Diagram provided by SOCOM) 
BICES provides NATO Secret with the ability to communicate with BICES 
member nations and NATO using secure e-mail, secure voice and VTC (via VOIP Face 
Phone), and shared early warning of Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) launches.  The 
services that U.S. BICES provides are a metadata tagged product database (finished and 
tear line); an Imagery Product Library (IPL); GCCSI3; Harmony; Google Earth; FMV via 
PSDS2; CIDNE; and secure social networking.  BICES provides access to operational 
tools to support strategic, operational, and tactical communications requirements (Figures 












Figure 56.   NSHQ SOCC Concept for BICES (Diagram provided by NSHQ) 
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Figure 57.   BICES Currently Being Used in Afghanistan (Diagram provided by NSHQ) 
P. SIGNAL CENTER (SIGCEN) 
SDN-Lite(vx) (Figure 58), is a deployable secure satellite communication system 
that provides secure voice, video, and data via a lightweight, commercial air transportable 
kit.  The SDN-L(vx) provides high-capacity BLACK voice/data and RED 
voice/data/video to small SOF teams (four to eight personnel) operating self-sufficiently 
at remote locations.  The SDN-L(vx) provides essential communication capability for 
situational awareness, mission planning, analysis, collaboration, and real-time mission 
coordination for SOF teams.  It provides deployed SOF teams seamless interaction with 
their respective theater; the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM); 
the Department of Defense (DoD); and any national-level command, control, 
communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems during short-term 
deployments or during the initial phases of an operation when no other in-theater, secure, 
tactical C4I structure exists. 
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Figure 58.   Special Operations Forces Deployable Node Lite(vx) [SDN-L(vx)] (Image 
provided by SOCOM) 
The USSOCOM has developed and fielded the SDN-L(vx), and tailored it to the 
C4I requirements of the tactical SOF community. The concept of the SDN-L(vx) (Figure 
59) is to provide high bandwidth network-centric communications capability in a very 
small package that requires minimal specialized operator training.  The SDN-L(vx) 
package will be ideal for a small  advanced liaison (ADVON) and liaison elements that 
will be representing NSHQ throughout the AOR. 
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Figure 59.   SDN-L(vx) Systems Capabilities Diagram (Image provided by SOCOM) 
SDN-Medium (SDN-M) is a deployable, lightweight, commercial air 
transportable, secure satellite communications system that provides secure voice, video, 
and data services.  The SDN-M (Figure 60), includes everything in the SDN-L (vx) plus 
additional equipment that provides deployed SOF with a first-in, robust C4I capability.  It 
ensures deployed SOF seamless interaction with their respective theater, the USSOCOM, 
the DoD, and any national-level C4I systems during short-term deployments or during 
the initial phases of an operation when no other in-theater, secure, tactical C4I 
infrastructure exists.  In prolonged, large-scale operations, sustained C4I support can be 
provided by theater communications assets with the SDN-M being used in an 
augmentation or supporting role. 
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Figure 60.   Special Operations Forces Deployable Node Medium (SDN-M)  (Image 
provided by SOCOM) 
USSOCOM has developed and fielded the SDN-M to meet the C4I requirements 
of the tactical SOF community.  The concept of operations, illustrated in Figure 61, is 
simple: Enable a deployed SOF team of 10–15 personnel with the ability to access the 
same sensitive compartmented information (SCI), collateral, and unclassified C4I 
services that are available to them in garrison (via SOF tactical gateways), from deployed 
locations around the world.  The SDN-M package will be ideal for the initial 70 man core 




Figure 61.   SDN-M Systems Capabilities Diagram (Image provided by SOCOM) 
The SDN-H, (Figure 62), provides a deployed SOF Headquarters with a first-in, 
robust C4I capability.  It ensures deployed SOF seamless interaction with their respective 
theater, the USSOCOM, the DoD, and any national C4I systems during short-term 
deployments or during the initial phases of a long-term operation when no other in-
theater, secure, tactical C4I infrastructure exists.  In prolonged, large-scale operations, 
sustained C4I support will be provided by theater communications assets, with the SDN-
H being used in an augmentation or supporting role. 
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Figure 62.   Special Operations Forces Deployable Node Heavy (SDN-H) (Image 
provided by SOCOM) 
The SDN-H concept of operations is simple: Enable the deployed SOF 
commander [for example, the commander of the Joint Special Operations Task Force 
(JSOTF)] and his staff with the ability to access the SCI, collateral, and unclassified C4I 
services that are available to them in garrison, from deployed locations around the world 








In this section, we introduce the concept of light, medium, and heavy.  Different 
organizations may have different definitions of these terms, but we present ours in order 
to create a common language for our discussion of these terms in this thesis. Table 4 
describes the capabilities, Table 5 lists the major pieces of hardware, and Table 6 
estimates the package costs of each of these three levels. 
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 DSN and Commercial 
Voice 
 Black Data 
Red Services: 
 Red Voice 
(SCAMPI/DRSN) 
 Red Data 
 Red VTC 
 Special Circuits 
Grey Services 
 Grey Voice 
 Grey Data 
 Grey VTC 
 Special Circuits 
 
Capabilities:  
SDN-H is an everything over IP (EoIP) system 
that employs a flexible and modular design.  
Black Services: 
 96 Available Data Ports 
 96 Supported IP Phones 
 36 POTS Phone Ports (incl. STUIII/STE) 
Red Services: 
 144 Available Data Ports 
 144 Supported IP Phones 
 60 POTS Phone Ports (incl. STUIII/STE) 
Grey Services: 
 46 Available Data Ports 
 12 POTS Phone Ports (incl. STUIII/STE) 
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Table 5.   SDN-Family Major Pieces of Hardware Chart (Provided by SOCOM) 
SDN-Lite(vx) SDN-Medium SDN-Heavy 
Major pieces of hardware: 
VSAT: 
 0.9M VSAT 
 iDirect Evolution Modem 
 700 BRX UPS 
Black Baseband: 
 Cisco 1812 Router 
 FIPS 140-2 certified 
 6 Port switch with PoE 
 Power conditioner 
 Power backup 
 4 conditioned AC outputs 
Red Baseband: 
 SecNet 54 
 Klas 2150 
 8 Ports; with 1 w/PoE 
 Integrated power backup 
Devices: 
 CF-19 Laptop 
 CF-52 Laptop 
 Cisco 7941 IP phone 
 
Major pieces of hardware: 
1.0M Hawkeye Lite Ku-Band auto 
acquire SATCOM terminal 
 
Everything included in the SDN-L 
(vx) plus the following additional 
equipment: 
 
COTS Equipment CISCO Routers 
 Multi-VLAN Switches 
 8-Port Switches 
 Laptop Computers 
 Cisco/Avaya IP Telephones 
 VoIP Soft Telephones 
 Flatbed Scanner 
 Projector 
 Desktop Cameras 
 Headsets 




Major pieces of hardware: 
DMSC 2.4M Deployable Tri-
Band or Quad-Band SATCOM 
Terminal 
 
Everything included in the SDN-
M plus the following 
additional equipment: 
 
Black and Red Baseband 
Modules (BBM) 
 ViaSat KG-250 HAIPE 
Encryptor 
 ViaSat xPEP TCP Accelerator 
 Cisco 3825 Router 
 Net VX900t Voice Accelerator 
 BlackBox VDSL Wire 
Modems 
Grey Baseband Module (BBM) 
 ViaSat KG-250 HAIPE 
Encryptor 
 ViaSat xPEP TCP Accelerator 
 Cisco 3825 Router 
 BlackBox VDSL Wire 
Modems 






















 1500VA UPS 
Local Expansion Module (LEM) 
 Cisco Catalyst 3560 Switch 
 Cisco VG224 Analog Phone 
Gateway 
 BlackBox VDSL Wire Modem 
 1000VA UPS 
Call Manager Module (CMM) 
















SDN-Lite(vx) SDN-Medium SDN-Heavy 
Cost: 
$220 thousand each 
Cost: 
$400 thousand each 
 
Cost: 
$2.2 Million (comes with complete 
TACLAN suite) 
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In addition to the SDN packages, the U.S. SOF units supplement their 
communications with a TACLAN suite.   Each TACLAN suite, illustrated in Figure 64, 
consists of three easily transportable, multiple-integrated networks; 60 general use 
laptops; and 10 intelligence laptops.  A TACLAN network contains commercial servers, 
routers, and hubs, which can operate at user-selectable classification levels [e.g., 
unclassified, collateral, coalition, or sensitive compartmented information (SCI) 
networks].  A TACLAN suite will allow SOCC to create its own domain.  It includes 
three large racks of servers, 70 computers, and its own UPS.  The TACLAN holds a huge 
amount of storage, runs its own e-mail exchange, and can be remotely accessed.  The 
TACLAN suite provides a package of independence and an abundance of storage. 
 
 
Figure 64.   Tactical Local Area Network (TACLAN) (Image provided by SOCOM) 
SDN-Lite(vx) packages can be used for liaisons  who represent the SOCC and  
allow them to travel with a small portable communications package that gives them 
compatible/interoperable communication equipment so they can send and receive  
information.  Secure iridium satellite phones (Figure 65), can be a cheaper alternative for 
this task.  As their last resort communication alternative, all U.S. SOF units use iridium 
satellite phones.  These phones will be a necessity at the SOCCs and SOTGs.  They cost 
$1,500 for unsecure phones and $3,000 for the secure iridium satellite phones. 
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Figure 65.   Iridium Phones (Image from iridium.com) 
All the SOF units that our research team visited concur with a phased-in approach 
as a solution for a signal and communications infrastructure.   This entails purchasing a 
SDM-H that comes with a TACLAN, an SDN-M, and a GBS suite for the SOCC Core 
headquarters.  The SDN-M, GBS, and TACLAN will deploy with the 70 man core during 
the first phase.  The TACLAN and GBS can supplement the SDN-M to make a more 
robust package that will increase its capabilities.  The SDN-H will arrive with the main 
body during the second phase.  The SDN-H will take the place of the SDN-M as the 
primary communications platform and the SDN-M will be used as back-up for the high 
priority users.  The SOCC Core will also deploy with at least two SDN-L (vx) and three 
iridium phones.  Additionally, each SOTG will deploy with a SDN-M, GBS suite, and an 
iridium phone.  The total cost for this SIGCEN is estimated at $6.5 million (Table 7). 
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Table 7.   Total Cost of SIGCEN 
Item Quantity Unit Cost Total Cost 
SDN-H 1 $2,200,000 $2,200,000 
SDN-M 7 $400,000 $2,800,000 
SDN-L (vx) 2 $220,000 $440,000 
GBS SUITE 7 $128,529 $899,703 
GBS Support 7 $9,950 $69,650 
GBS Training 1 $23,750 $23,750 
Iridium Phone 9 $3,000 $27,000 




In developing our conclusions for the SUPCEN, we considered the following 
factors: weight, size, costs, ease of setup, durability, transportability, environmental 
factors, and function. All of the manufacturers we compared surpassed the minimum 
requirements and standards we received from the NSHQ’s J4.  As we stated earlier, there 
are other manufacturers of military camps, but these four companies were most often 
recommended to our team during our initial meetings with several operational military 
units. As our data shows (Table 8), Alaska Structures came out on top in almost every 
category. We used three measuring criteria for our table: exceed requirements (), met 
requirements ( ), met requirements / substandard (). In our study, Exceed 
Requirements meant the manufacture was well above the minimum requirements we 
received from the NSHQ or the feedback we received from the various units was well 
above average. Met Requirements meant the manufacture met all of the minimum 
requirements we received from the NSHQ and the feedback from the units in the field 
were either neutral or had a mix of both positive and negative comments. Met 
Requirements /Substandard meant that the manufacturer met all of the NSHQ 
requirements but most of the feedback from the units in the field were negative. In the 
following section, we briefly cover each manufacturer and discuss some of the bigger 
factors that led to our conclusions. 
When we started the camp study, we initially wanted to analyze each 
manufacturer’s shelters, generators, and ablutions. We studied the shelters and ablutions 
in great detail, but, when it came to generators, we found that the commands and units 
were looking for smaller generators. Most of the units we talked to could not tell us who 
manufactured their generator or where it came from. Most of the units did not care who 
manufactured the generators; instead, what they wanted was smaller generators. For 
example, for the soft-sided shelter systems (AKS, Base–X, and DRASH), users preferred 
the 35 kW generators over the 60 kW generators that are standard for most camps. With 
the Weatherhaven systems, users wanted a smaller generator than the current 35 kW 
generator, which is standard for this system; the noise was the primary reason. Users 
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found that the 60 kW generators were more unreliable, and if they lost one generator, 
they did not necessarily have a back-up option. To overcome this issue, users suggested 
getting two 35 kW generators instead of one large 60 kW generator. This gives the camps 
more options if one generator goes down for any reason. A generator loss can be more 
easily compensated for if a redundant system is available. Also, the 35 kW generators 
make considerably less noise than the bigger 60 kW generators. 
 






















By company Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ease of set‐up 
(time/personnel)
2 2 3 2 2
Transportable 
Package
2 3 2 2 2
Durability 2 2 3 2 2




2 2 3 2 2
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Spares Availability 








As we studied each manufacturer, we discovered that each was very good in the 
areas of training, transportation/shipping, and spare parts availability. Most of their 
customer service departments’ promise 24/7 customer service availability. In the rest of 
this section, we break down several of the differences in these manufactures. When it 
came to transportation, we assumed the camp would have a HUMVV-type vehicle 
available for transporting some of the equipment for the last mile. As a result, we found 
several of the solutions we examined, particularly the HDT Global and DRASH systems 
that are set up on trailers, to be useful and effective. 
One of the problems we heard from users in the field regarding HDT’s Base-X 
was that this system’s frames are not as rugged and sturdy as Alaska Structure's frames. 
We were told the plastic and aluminum framing breaks. In addition, these systems have a 
field life of three years, while the Alaska Structures and DRASH systems have a field life 
of five years. We had problems gathering all of the cost data from HDT Global, the 
manufacturer of Base-X; they were reluctant to share their cost data with us, even after 
we had contacted them several times, so we could not do a good cost comparison against 
the other manufacturers. We really liked Base-X’s alternative energy equipment. No 
other manufacturer came close to the equipment that HDT Global had available in the 
field. Their equipment was revolutionary, and we highly recommend looking into HDT 
Global’s alternative energy equipment for any power requirements solution. Users with 
available alternative energy solutions were not as worried about the supply convoys 
making it to their camp, because they knew they had electric power available to them via 
the solar power they used in camp. 
With the DRASH systems, we liked the M Series shelters for their overall size 
and for the convenience of shipping on DRASH’s Trailer Mounted Support System 
(TMSS). Traditional DRASH systems are fitted on trailers and are convenient for a 
rapidly deployable DRASH. DRASH’s trailer system was done well and liked by their 
users. However, the shelter system itself was not rated as highly as the Alaska Structures 
and Base–X shelters. Several users had switched over to Base-X and Alaska Structures 
for their shelter systems, and they preferred these shelters due to their durability, ease of 
setup, and comfort. The DRASH representatives were very helpful in gathering 
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information, and they provided great customer support when we were working toward a 
solution. Several units in the Army and Marines use DRASH and are happy with their 
shelters. 
Weatherhaven had some of the most deluxe camp solutions we came across and 
their products were exceptional. Their hard-sided shelters, the MECC and TRECC, truly 
show the convenience of a shelter system that is ready for rapid deployment and 
transportation. It is the convenience of having the shelter basically in a shipping container 
and ready to move. One of the issues we saw, but were unable to verify, related to the 
mobility of the MECC and the TRECC on sandy or soft ground terrain, or in a snow 
environment. The shelters move easily on firm, hard surfaces, but deploying them to an 
unknown area, where the terrain could easily change from mission to mission, could 
drastically affect the camp’s ability to move to a more suitable place, which is a big 
concern. Weatherhaven’s hard-sided shelters were very dependent upon deploying to an 
area with perfect conditions. In terms of the transportation of the SOCC, we were initially 
designing for a camp that could be internally loaded into a CH-47 “Chinook” helicopter. 
We visited a CH-47 squadron in Stockton, CA, that had supported Special Operations 
missions during Operation Enduring Freedom, and these aircrew members stated they 
preferred a tandem load underneath the helicopter (Figure 67), rather than an internal load 
(Figure 68). Several factors went into that recommendation, with increased safety being 
the first and most important.  The aircrews (loadmasters) must be able to walk around the 
aircraft to perform visual checks outside the aircraft, while reporting continuous updates 
to the pilots throughout the flight/sortie.  These safety checks are particularly important 
during landings and movement close to the ground, especially while operating in hostile 
environments.  We gave the aircrew the dimensions of the TRECC, and they commented 
that it would be difficult to perform their safety checks with a large item, such as a 
TRECC, inside.  Although it would not be impossible, they would rather tandem sling 
load the TRECC, if they had a choice. They preferred a tandem sling load to a single 
sling load (Figure 66).  The aircrews can drop off a sling-loaded item quickly, safely, and 
accurately (inside of a parking space), which results in less time spent in the operating 












Figure 67.   CH-47 Tandem Sling Load (Images, 2011) 
 
Figure 68.   CH-47 Internal Load with TRECC (Weatherhaven) 
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Another issue we heard about from one of the users was the ability to keep the 
elements out of the Weatherhaven shelter. This issue affected the shelter’s poor durability 
rating. The user told us that his unit encountered several leaks in their MECC and that 
mice had gotten into the wiring bundles under the MECC floors, because they were 
unable to seal off those areas. We spoke with Weatherhaven’s representatives about this 
issue, and they said that they had addressed it, and it was fixed. 
We also scored the MECC poorly in the life cycle cost area, because a user told us 
that the MECC had to go back to the manufacturer for upgrades and overhaul after 18 
months, if exposed to the elements, and after 24 months, if it was under cover in theater. 
Each shelter costs an average of approximately $17,500 to repair. One of the users 
MECCs had to go back to the manufacturer for upgrades and modifications totaling 
approximately $70,000. Granted, it could be argued that the command asked for the 
upgrades to their MECC, and that these were the initial MECCs so Weatherhaven has 
now incorporated the lessons learned into its current MECC design. However, we are 
concerned because, instead of just one component having to be sent in, the entire unit had 
to be sent in, thus increasing the total cost of maintaining the system over the whole life 
of the shelter. 
The cost for the Weatherhaven solution was more than double the cost for the 
Alaska Structures solution. The cost could be better managed if Weatherhaven scaled 
back some of the MECCs that were slated for the ablutions. Each ablution cost $275,000, 
and a 150-person camp would require four MECCs to meet the camp requirements. 
Choosing a soft-side shelter in that area alone would not only save over $1 million, but 
would also eliminate three sorties in getting these ablution facilities into the theater. We 
understand how nice the Weatherhaven MECC and TRECC are, but at that cost of 
luxury, our team did not see the cost benefit in going with the Weatherhaven solution. By 
eliminating the requirement for internally carrying the TRECC, we reduced the sortie 
requirements for a CH-47 helicopter from 40 to 31 and from 36 to 31, if the sorties 
combined the troop movement of 150 troops with moving the camp into theater. 
We chose Alaska Structures for multiple reasons, but one of the biggest reasons 
was our observations of these shelters in the field. They were of the best quality 
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compared to the other systems evaluated and their ease of operation was high. The units 
we visited also had high praise for Alaska Structures’ products. Numerous SOCOM units 
in the U. S. currently use Alaska Structures as their camp of choice. We did not select 
them for that reason alone. We considered several other factors, but we felt that it was 
important to mention that some of the leading SF units in the entire world use Alaska 
Structures’ products:  We wanted to find out why, and we did. 
Several users said Alaska Structures were the easiest to set up and tear down, and 
most of the users we visited used multiple manufacturers’ products for their camps. In 
fact, when that was the case, Alaska Structures was always the recommended 
manufacturer. A few of the other manufacturers’ frames did not go up as easily and as 
quickly as the company stated. 
Alaska Structures also surpassed the other manufacturers in the area of 
environmental conditions. Their shelters far exceeded our minimum requirements. For 
example, Alaska Structures’ gable roof system shelter can handle snow loads of up to 125 
lb/sq ft (56.7 kg/m2; and it tested successfully for wind loads of up to 120 mph (193 
km/h). The AKSS was tested to successfully withstand wind loads of 70 mph (112.7 
km/h) with gusts of 80 mph (128.75 km/h)  Tests also showed that it can handle 
successfully a snow load of 20 lb/sq ft (9 kg; PSF) Structures, Alaska Structures, 2011). 
Our minimum requirements were as follows:  
1. Withstand snow loads of 10 lb (5 kg) per sq ft.(m) for 12 hours without  
 damage to the frame or structure  
 2. Withstand wind loads of 55 mph (89 km/h), with gusts up to 65 mph (105  
 km/h) 
All of the shelters performed equally well in the area of temperature control and 
were operational from -20–120 °F (-29–49 °C).  
Our final comparison point was cost data. In Table 9 our cost data includes all of 
the shelters, ablutions, and generators for the SUPCEN piece of the camp. We were given  
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very “close estimates” from all of the manufacturers we studied, except for HDT Global’s 
Base-X camp. We made several attempts to gather this data from multiple sources, but 
were unable to get the data from them.  
 




Alaska Structures $2.8 M 276 
DRASH $2.9M 177 
Weatherhaven $5.9M 318 
Table 9.   Shipping and Cost Comparison Table9 
Our comparison of all of the data and parameters set forth in this study shows that 
Alaska Structures is the best option. Figure 70 shows how each manufacturer ranked on a 
scale of 1–5, with 1 being the poorest result and 5 being the highest. Each manufacturer 
had the best product in at least one area; however, when all the factors were considered as 
a whole, Alaska Structures came out on top, and we would recommend it for use by any 
military force looking to assemble a rapidly deployable camp anywhere around the 
world. Our final solution is depicted in the drawing below from Alaska Structure of the 
150-person SOCC camp (Figure 69). 
 
                                                 
6 The shipping data was received from Alaska Structures Engineering Department. 
7 The Shipping data was received from DRASH Sales representative as an estimate. 
8 The shipping data was based off inputs received from Weatherhaven on an 84 man camp set-up. We 
multiplied the life support areas of the camp by a factor of 1.5 to get an estimate on shipping.  
9 The data we received for this table were obtained from the manufactures. These cost were 





Figure 69.   Alaska Structures 150 Camp Drawing (Alaska Structure, personal 
communication, November 11, 201110) 
                                                 
10 We received permission from Alaska Structures to use the camp diagram via an e-mail dated 
November 11, 2011. 
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Figure 70.   Major Decision Factors 
In Figure 70 we present six of the major decision factors we took into account 
with this study. The first factor was the user recommendations we received from each of 
the units we visited. We measured everything on a scale of 1–5. In the user 
recommendations area, a 5 indicated that the users had no complaints and would 
recommend the product to another user. A score of 1 meant none of the users liked the 
product and would not recommend this manufacturer’s camp. With the cost data, we gave 
a product a 5 if it was very cost effective and a 1 if it was not very cost effective. In the 













environmental conditions and performance area, we based the scoring criteria on 
published testing conducted on each camp, with a score of 5 indicating that the camp far 
exceeded the requirements and a 1 indicating that the camp did not meet the established 
requirements. With durability, we took into account not only published life expectancies, 
but also reports from users on how well a particular shelter performed under field 
conditions. A 5 meant well above average durability, and a 1 meant well below average 
durability. With weight and size, we looked at the ability to minimize and condense the 
camp for transportation: A 5 represented a small shipping footprint, and a 1 represented a 
very large shipping footprint. Our final criterion was ease of the setup, which included 
the time required to build the camp, as well as the equipment required to set up the camp. 
A 5 represented minimal time and tools required to set up the camp, and a 1 represented a 
long and difficult setup time and the requirement for outside tools and equipment to build 
the camp. 
A required piece of special equipment is the skid loader.  It is useful when setting 
up and tearing down the camp and is capable of handling many of the situations/issues 
encountered while operating a forward-deployed operational camp. 
For the medical solution of this rapidly deployable camp, several good soft-sided 
shelter options were available by all of the manufacturers and were equally good at 
meeting general medical care requirements. But if the medical care requires a hard- sided 
shelter, the TRECC is a good option. The SOCOM units we visited in the U.S. used soft-
sided systems for their solution. Our study did not evaluate the requirements necessary to 
perform the mission of the medical staff, but only compared what is currently available in 
the supply system and what is used by all military forces. 
A. COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTER DISPLAYS 
For the OPCEN, we considered either LCD or projector displays. Discussions 
with operational users revealed that plasma displays create too much heat and have a 
larger failure rate then LCDs and projectors.  This explains the omission of plasma 
displays in the compilation of our final recommendations.  DRASH and Spec Ops Inc. 
were stood out from other manufacturers.  In regards to the cables used to connect 
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equipment in the OPSEN, there were two major choices:  twisted cables (CAT6) and 
VGA cables.  The VGA are less expensive, but heavier (.8 lb at 6 ft).  On the other hand, 
the CAT6 twisted cable is much lighter (.15 lb at 6 ft), but more expensive.  The weight 
has been the determining factor in numerous U.S. military units that have chosen the 
CAT6, and that cable is also our recommended choice. 
We made a comparison of both manufacturers during a site visit to Ft. Bragg.  
The equipment of both manufacturers is currently fielded by operational SOCOM units.  
The operators were satisfied overall and provided recommendations in support of the 
equipment provided by both manufacturers.  We also received price quotes from both 
manufacturers.  Spec Ops, Inc. provided larger screens, several HD/LED monitors, and 
an overall better display package.  When requesting future quotes, both manufacturers 
should be asked to provide a proposal, because both are competitive and their cost are 
comparable and come in around $200,000. 
The Spec Ops quote included the following; 
1. Large Screen Display (LSD) - Rapid setup/strike display system 
consisting of a rugged but lightweight aluminum frameset and three 1024x768 (XGA) 
DLP projectors. The overhead front setup produces an 18' x 4.5' display area and the 
lower rear setup produces 15' x 3.75' display area. All components pack inside three 
rugged, aluminum cases measuring 84" x 18" x 18". 
2. Two 65” HD LED monitor with remote controls; auto lift mounting 
system. External waterproof electronic interface I/O panel for power, audio, IP, and video 
inputs; aluminum transit case meets U. S. military transit and vibration specifications. 
3. Video and audio, 21 input/12 output, twisted pair-based distribution 
system. Features three multi-image processors capable of producing 2 - 4 resizable image 
windows through a single display. 
4. 20 Standard tactical tables, 6' in length, rugged, lightweight aluminum, 
integrated and internally enclosed 120/240VAC power, two data networks and twisted 
pair video distribution. 
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5. 10 External jumper cables and all necessary cabling to connect multiple 
tables together with two networks, twisted pair video and power. 
The tiered flooring in use by operational SOCOM units is available from Bike 
Track, Inc. Their two tiered flooring system provided the greatest visibility for all users. 
The wiring is hidden underneath the floor for safe and uninterrupted operations. Their 
flooring system was recommended by DRASH and Spec Ops, Inc., and by the 
operational units we visited.  The approximate cost for the flooring and platforms was 
around $180,000.  Due to proprietary and confidentiality requirements on the information 
(quotes) provided, we are unable to include them in this document.  This information is 
available to government agencies, on request. 
B. THE PHASE-IN APPROACH 
As we mentioned earlier, the all source center will be a driving requirement for a 
robust communications infrastructure.  During our visit with the U.S. SOF, NSWG-2 
MCT and SOCOM, they both gave the same recommendations given NSHQ’s 
requirements for SOCC capabilities.  They recommended a phased-in approached.  First, 
the initial advance party, SOCC Core, should start with an SDN-Medium with a 
TACLAN; additionally, GBS or NATO’s SBS should be utilized to cut down on 
SATCOM bandwidth.  Users can also supplement the SDN-Medium with a larger dish 
(i.e., larger bandwidth).  Second, when the main body (the full SOCC will be up to 150 
personnel) deploys, they will bring out an SDN-H-like package.  The SDN-M will be 
retained as a backup, in case any or all of the SDN-M is taken out of action for any 
reason.  This kind of redundancy is recommended for “no-fail” missions.  The estimated 
total basic cost for this communications package is $6.5 million. 
Our study shows that the basic cost structure for a rapidly deployable camp can be 
built with ideal equipment for approximately $10M, (Table 10) to include: the basic life 









Function Solution Cost 
LOGCEN Alaska Structures $2,800,000  
OPCEN Spec Ops or Drash $440,000  
ASC/SIGCEN 
1 x SDN-H 
$6,460,103  7 x SDN-M 
 2 x SDN- L (vx) 
7 x GBS 
Total Cost= $9,700,103  
 
Table 10.   Approximate Cost for NSHQ Camp 
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